International Communication Research Journal

Editorial Review Board

International Communication Research Journal - Brief History

The *International Communication Research Journal* is a publication of the International Communication Division (ICD) of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC). It was first published in 1966 as the *International Communication Bulletin,* and in its present title in 2008. The ICRJ is hosted by the Department of Journalism, Texas Christian University, Texas, USA. It is published bi-annually, with an acceptance rate of 21-23%.

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Editor's Corner……

We continue to receive commendations for arguably being the first international communication journal to highlight how journalism and mass communication professors across the globe swiftly adjusted their course syllabi and teaching delivery methods in response to the sudden onslaught of the Covid-19 pandemic (see ICRJ, SP 2020 Edition).

We appreciate the commendations we received from across the globe.

In this edition, we explore what motivates "Newsjunkies" in three Arab nations to keep up with news; how various media outlets reacted to news about Donald J. Trump's surprise electoral victory in the 2016 presidential election in the United States; how leaders and indigenes of a community in Nigeria use their traditional festival to encourage all forms of development enterprises in their community; and an examination of how two top prime ministerial contenders used Twitter for political communication in India's 2019 national elections.

In our book review section, we present an exciting book titled, *Discourses of the Developing World: Researching Properties, Problems and Potentials of the Developing World.*

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Diagnosing 'Newsjunkies': Fielding and validating a measure of intrinsic need for orientation

Justin D. Martin[1]

Prior research on need for orientation claimed to measure an intrinsic interest in getting news, but, operationally, measured motivation to get news about specific events, often a U.S. election. This study tested a broader intrinsic need-for-orientation scale, and assessed reliability and validity of the measure in nationally representative samples from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE (N=3,239). The scale measures a broad, intrinsic need for orientation (INFO) that motivates people to regularly consume news. This study affords researchers in journalism, communication, and other fields a parsimonious way to measure individuals' inherent interest in keeping up with news.

Keywords: News consumption, uses and gratifications, intrinsic need for orientation, Arab Gulf countries

The need for orientation (NFO) was a popular research area in the 1970s, following initial work by McCombs and Weaver (1973). NFO was an important motive to seek news about a specific issue, usually an election (Weaver, 1980; Lee, 2015). Research showed that people who felt a need to know more about an election were more susceptible to agenda-setting effects from news on campaign issues. Two factors, *relevance* (an impending campaign) and *uncertainty* (being unsure of whom to vote for) motivated people to get election news, according to McCombs and Weaver. A more recent measure by Matthes (2005; 2008) added interest in news about a single topic or issue as a component of NFO. This present study expands NFO research further, examining the *intrinsic motivation* to consume news.

According to McCombs (1999, p.155) the need for orientation is the "*inherent, psychological need* to be attuned to [one's] environment" (emphasis added). However, research on NFO did not operationalize the phenomenon as a general, intrinsic need for news but instead studied individuals' motivation to consume news about specific topics, usually political elections in the U.S. (see Weaver, 1980). The present study expands the operationalization of NFO to a breadth befitting its originally inclusive definition. The need for orientation is operationalized as an inherent motivation, distinct from the numerous extrinsic reasons people consume news, and a measure of the intrinsic need for orientation (INFO) toward news.

Consequently, this study: (a) expands the measurement of need for orientation to focus broadly on individuals' general, intrinsic desire to keep up with news about current events; (b) tests for validity and reliability a scale of items measuring intrinsic need for orientation, including an examination of media-related predictors of INFO; and (c) reconnects NFO with the uses-and-gratifications paradigm, within which NFO was originally positioned by McCombs and Weaver .The scale could be said to assess the "newsjunkie" tendency, which usually describes someone

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with a persistent, internal attraction to news about current events. This study will be useful in a variety of ways, including but not limited to:

Audience research

Identifying heavy news consumers; researchers and news organizations can identify "newsjunkies"—individuals with a strong intrinsic motivation to follow news.

Media use across the lifespan

Many young people find consuming news onerous (Buckingham, 1999), though they often access news more frequently as they age, a shift researchers of intrinsic motivations call "internalization"—the process by which an extrinsic motivation becomes intrinsic (DeSteno, 2018). The INFO scale can measure such longitudinal changes. Young Millennials in the U.S. tend to be passive news consumers, relying on extrinsic forces to bring news to them, while older Millennials are more likely to proactively get news (Young, 2015). Lewis (2008) found that college students expected, five years hence, that they would get less of their news and information from social media, and more from legacy media, including print newspapers.

(Re-)Positioning Need-For-Orientation Research within Uses and Gratifications

McCombs and Weaver linked NFO to the uses-and-gratifications paradigm, and to the surveillance motivation specifically. But their operationalization of NFO put it in the context of attribute agenda-setting and elections, and most NFO research since the 1970s has had this focus. Camaj (2018) and Camaj and Weaver (2013) examined NFO regarding voters' levels of relevance and uncertainty regarding a forthcoming election.

Potential voters interested in an upcoming election are said to score high in relevance, meaning they devoted more attention to news about the campaign. And voters with weak political party identification were presumably uncertain about whom they would vote for and, therefore, desired more news about the election.

Setting aside that this conceptualization is inappropriate for countries without direct elections, the McCombs and Weaver operationalization is problematic in other ways: highly partisan voters are said to have lower need for orientation, because they are more certain about a political campaign than those with low partisanship (Weaver, 1991), who themselves desire more news because they are uncertain for whom to vote, but research actually documents the opposite: political party identity is associated with *more* news consumption (Ksiazek, Malthouse & Webster, 2010; Weeks & Holbert, 2013; Coe et al., 2008).

The second component of McCombs and Weaver's NFO formula is an individual's interest in (i.e. relevance of) an approaching election. But an individual can be invested in episodic political contests and not have a strong intrinsic attraction to news generally. Either way, McCombs and Weaver's operationalization does not enable determining whether respondents are interested in a political campaign because they find such processes fascinating (intrinsic motivation) or they just want to be informed because an election is coming (extrinsic).

Indeed, the very notion that someone needs news about an election because they are uncertain about whom to vote for acknowledges that, for these individuals, the election is an extrinsic motivator. McCombs and Weaver found undecided voters

were more likely to consume news about an upcoming election, but only if they felt a strong NFO—because they were *charged to make a decision* about whom to vote for (McCombs & Weaver, 1973). This describes a response to extrinsic pressure, not an inherent need for news.

Apparently recognizing some limitations in McCombs et al., Matthes (2005) created a 12-item scale to measure NFO toward a single issue (not necessarily a political election), with three sub-components: NFO toward the issue ("It is important for me to observe this issue constantly"); toward facts about the issue/topic ("For this topic, I expect detailed background information"); and toward journalistic evaluations of the issue ("I attach great importance to commentaries on this topic"). While some items in Matthes's scale might assess intrinsic motivation, it is not conclusive about whether interest in news about a specific issue is intrinsic or extrinsic. For instance, a political consultant might "attach great importance to commentaries" on a topic because doing so might help land a contract, but at the same time have little intrinsic interest in that news. Unlike Matthes's 12-item scale, the four-item INFO measure in the current study is parsimonious, allowing researchers room to measure INFO as either an independent or dependent variable.

When the operationalization of NFO is broadened to assess generalized interest in news, the concept fits, as it was originally conceptualized, within the uses-and-gratifications paradigm. In earlier uses-and-gratifications literature, a need for news was called a "surveillance" motivation. Surveillance measures themselves, though, are also not adequate for assessing INFO. Prior surveillance research assessed individuals' belief that specific media, like newspapers or magazines, are *useful* for staying abreast of news and for understanding current events (see Vincent & Basil, 1997). But someone can deem newspapers useful for learning things and yet never access newspapers themselves, so previous surveillance research does not actually assess news consumption; the INFO measure tested here does.

Other studies have examined consumers' motivation for getting news from specific news mediums, such as online newspapers. Chung and Yoo (2008) found that users of an online newspaper were motivated to use the news site for information-seeking, and for social and entertainment motivations. The questions asked were constructed for users of that news outlet, however, and so did not measure an intrinsic need for news that could be compared with other members of the public who don't use that news outlet. That Chung et al. found that news users' motivations were for information-seeking, social interests, and entertainment, though, bolsters the items in the INFO scale, which address, in part, the motivation to be competent in current events and to better relate to other people.

Flanigin and Metzger (2001) found that the motivations for information-seeking online were similar to motivations found in prior research to drive use of legacy news media. Some of the motivations Flanigin et al. assessed share similarities with those in the INFO measure, though what the INFO scale adds beyond these measures is the component of *time urgency*. A newsjunkie's need to get news first thing during the day, feeling discomfort when they can't access the latest news, and checking news during their downtime are all components of items in the INFO

scale. Flanagin et al. used items assessing how useful media are for specific tasks.

This study maintains that an intrinsic need for orientation is something broader than a need for news about a political contest or another singular topic, and also that the need for orientation is distinct from the conviction that various media are useful for understanding current affairs. It therefore posits that people vary in their general attraction to news coverage of diverse topics, and that the surveillance need to monitor mass media is actually just that: the intrinsic urge to survey news.

Explication of intrinsic need for orientation

While this study is not a call to end measuring need for news about a U.S. election or interest in news of any other single topic, it proposes a way to appropriately measure a broad intrinsic desire to keep up with news, by incorporating research from psychology on intrinsic motivation and its subcomponents, upon which the four items forming the INFO scale were constructed.

Ryan and Deci defined intrinsic motivation as the "human propensity to learn and assimilate," and they emphasize that people vary in their intrinsic motivation to engage in specific behaviors (Ryan & Deci, 2000, pp. 54-67). They identified three elements of intrinsic motivation: competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In *competence*, an individual feels that effort devoted to a task leads to a positive result, and that improvement comes with practice. Consequently, the more individuals consume news the more likely they are to understand news coverage and its contexts (Ashley, Maksl & Craft, 2013). The competence aspect of the INFO scale is a key juncture where the index differs from prior measurement of NFO, and is addressed with the item "I feel discomfort when I don't know what's going on in the world."

Relatedness refers to a feeling of being connected to other people (Deci & Ryan, 1991). Just as people consume entertainment to enhance their conversations with others (see Anghelcev, Sar, Martin & Moultrie, 2020), they also often consume news to better participate in conversations with other people. Casually, this is called feeling "in the loop" or being "well-informed." Classical need-for-orientation research measured the motivation to keep up with news as partly generated by a feeling of falling behind in knowledge of an election (Lee & Oh, 2013).

Autonomy involves wanting to complete a task rather than being forced to do so by an external agent. An intrinsic interest is something an individual wants to do, or believes they want to do, themselves. Being forced by an external actor to perform a task weakens motivation to work on that task (Lepper & Greene, 1975). In a study by Lee and Lin (2019), autonomy was the primary intrinsic motivator for individuals seeking online health information. A scale measuring a broad INFO should include items assessing if individuals find consuming news to be enjoyable, as opposed to a chore (the INFO scale tested here does).

Competence, relatedness, and autonomy are all represented in the INFO scale. It is important to note that research on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations consider the concepts to be on a spectrum, rather than as categorical opposites. So, too, does the current study consider intrinsic need for orientation as a spectral measure. And one's INFO score may change over time.

Definition of Intrinsic Need for Orientation

Based on the way prior research discussed, though not measured, need for

orientation, and based also on aforementioned literature on intrinsic motivation, this study defines intrinsic need for orientation as: *An individual's motivation to routinely and frequently seek and consume news, for the positive emotions of feeling informed and to avoid negative emotions of feeling behind.*

Media-system Differences among Arab Countries in the Study

Conducted in three Arab Gulf countries, this study not only evaluated intrinsic need for orientation across nations, but in countries that host millions of expatriates from Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. The samples used in this study comes from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE populations, and include people from many countries and different cultural and economic backgrounds.

This study also comes at a geopolitically auspicious time, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (also Egypt and Bahrain) have led a political and physical blockade against Qatar since 2017. The blockade of Qatar began with the hacking and publication of fake news items on a Qatar government news site, with the blockading countries demanding, among other things, that the Qatar-based Al Jazeera news organization be shut down (Pinnell, 2018), an order Qatar ignored.

Annual surveys by Northwestern University in Qatar have since 2013 tracked news use in the countries examined in the current study, as well as several other Arab states (Dennis, Martin & Hassan, 2018). Findings suggest that Gulf Arabs are avid news consumers, and Qataris especially so. Even pre-blockade, more Qataris than any other Arab nationality surveyed said they read a print newspaper every day (32% vs. <25%), despite that Qataris are just as digitally connected as Saudis and Emiratis (Dennis, Martin & Wood, 2016). Qataris, more than other nationals in the same study, said they check news online at least once a day (42% vs. <39% respectively).

The three countries in this study all censor internet content (Freedom House, 2017), making VPNs attractive or imperative for many people in these countries. As a result, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the highest VPN use rates of any of the countries surveyed by Dennis et al. (2018). VPN use is illegal in the UAE and the government actively monitors and surveils digital activists. As news use differs across these Arab Gulf countries, so, too, does an intrinsic desire to get news likely differ among these populations.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

Based on the above literature, the following hypotheses (H) and research questions (RQ) were developed for this study:

H1: Internal reliability for the intrinsic need-for-orientation (INFO) scale will be robust in both Arabic and English in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, and among both nationals and non-nationals within each country.

Streiner and Kottner (2014) note that "validity studies" of scales test hypotheses of convergent and discriminant validity, in addition to assessing the internal consistency of a scale, and they refer to studies that do only the latter as "reliability studies." This study is also a validity study. Hypothesis two tests the convergent validity of the INFO scale. If the scale assesses what it is meant to, news use should positively predict INFO.

H2: News consumption will correlate positively with respondents' INFO scores, after holding factors such as education, income, age, and others constant.

Research question one addresses the scale's convergent and discriminant validity. The omnibus survey data analyzed in this study contained not only media use variables and basic demographic factors, but also numerous attitudinal measures, such as assessments of media credibility, opposition to censorship, concerns about online surveillance, and others. This study examines the association between INFO and both media use variables and media-related attitudes.

RQ1: What are additional key media use variables, attitudes about media topics, and demographic variables that are significantly correlated with INFO?
Qataris are more avid news consumers than Saudis or Emiratis, and data in this current study were collected well after a blockade of Qatar started; a population that heavily consumes news and is threatened by regional powers may report stronger INFO than nationals in countries that are not so threatened, though there is insufficient prior data to support a formal hypothesis on this, so we pose a research question:

RQ2: Will Qataris, Saudis, and Emiratis differ in their INFO scores?

Method

This study developed and tested an intrinsic need for orientation measure to examine inherent interest in news, among citizens and non-national residents in representative samples in three countries (N=3,239): Saudi Arabia (n=1,083), Qatar (n=1,120), and the UAE (n=1,036). Nationals in each country were n=740 in Saudi Arabia, n=281 in Qatar, and n=233 in the UAE. The comparatively small number of Qatar and UAE nationals is appropriate, as expatriates outnumber citizens in both countries. Nationality is included as a dummy variable in regression models for each country. Institutional review board approval for this study came from Georgetown University in Qatar, one of the oversight boards for human subjects in social science research among U.S. universities in Qatar (IRB Protocol #20140870).

Sampling and Data Collection

This study used data from *Media Use in the Middle East* (Dennis et al., 2018), an omnibus study of media use and sociopolitical attitudes conducted by Northwestern University in Qatar annually in at least six Arab countries. For reasons of survey length, INFO scale items were only fielded in three Gulf countries. Data were collected by The Harris Poll in face-to-face interviews in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in human phone interviews in Qatar. The Harris Poll also assists in producing Northwestern University in Qatar's annual report on the study. Qatar limits door-to-door sampling to counter survey fatigue, as the country has a small number of citizen households. Response rates for completed interviews were robust: 65% in Saudi Arabia, 58% in Qatar, and 57% in UAE. Data were collected from August 1 to September 4, 2018 in the three countries.
Data were collected using multistage random probability sampling. In Saudi Arabia and UAE, researchers started at randomly designated points in cities and rural areas across the countries, and followed instructions to randomly select

domiciles. Random-digit dialing methods were used in Qatar, utilizing sampling frames from the country's two telecommunication providers. Rim weighting was utilized to strengthen representativeness, and weighting factors were gender, age, and nationality/citizenship. Survey duration was 28-30 minutes. Rim weighting gives each respondent a weight in the data set based on several of their characteristics simultaneously, so that people underrepresented in the sample data are given a greater weight when analyses are conducted, and people overrepresented in the data are given a lesser weight. Respondents completed the survey in Arabic or English. The study was funded by Qatar Foundation, Northwestern University in Qatar, and Doha Film Institute. Demographic characteristics of each country's sample are in the Appendix.

Measurement

Intrinsic need-for-orientation scale. Four statements were fielded to measure INFO, in five-point Likert scales:

1. *When I have down time, I check news or news headlines.* This relates to the autonomy component of Deci and Ryan's work on intrinsic motivation
2. *One of the first things I do each day is check the news.* This item also relates to the concept of autonomy.
3. *I feel discomfort when I don't know what's going on in the world.*
   This item relates to the intrinsic motivation component of competence, where a feeling of discomfort arises from feeling "behind" with regard to news consumption.
4. *Keeping up with the news makes me feel more connected to other people.* This involves the relatedness component of intrinsic motivation.

Potential correlates of INFO. Three groups of predictors of INFO were assembled from Media Use in the Middle East data, the expectation being that if the INFO scale measures what it purports to, both media use indicators and certain attitudes about media, such as support for free speech, will positively predict INFO.

1. Media use indicators were: *check news online for entertainment* (1=never, 6=several times a day); *percent of online video respondent estimates is news* versus purely entertainment (ratio-level measurement); *use Twitter, Instagram and Facebook* (1=yes, 0=no); *use VPN* (1=yes, 0=no; not asked in UAE, where VPNs are illegal); *news informs entertainment choices* (1=not at all important for these choices, 5=very important).
2. Media-related attitudes were the next block of predictors: (a) *news media in this country are credible;* (b) *media in this country can report news without interference from officials;* (c) *support free speech online:* "It is ok for people to express their ideas on the internet, even if they are unpopular"; (d) *worry about online surveillance:* index of two items: "I am worried about governments checking what I do online," and "I am worried about companies checking what I do online" - The Guttman split-half coefficient=.88; (e) *comfortable speaking out about politics:* "In general, I feel comfortable saying what I think about politics." The ratings for the above were from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree; (f) *conservatism:* "Compared to most nationals in your country, how would you describe yourself?" were 1=culturally very progressive to 5=culturally very conservative.

Demographic factors were *nationality* (national=1, expatriate=0); *age* (ratio-level measurement); *gender* (female=1, male=0); *education* (1=no formal education, 10=obtained at least one graduate degree); and *religiosity* (1=never attend religious observances, 10=attend religious observances once a day or more. In Qatar, there are churches and mosques; in UAE, churches, mosques, and one synagogue; in Saudi Arabia, just mosques, with the exception of some Christian places of worship in expatriate energy-worker compounds). *Income* was also measured, though was assessed differently in each country: Qatar (1=<3,000 Qatar riyals per month, 15= >75,000 riyals/month); Saudi Arabia (1= <3,000 Saudi riyals per month, 12= >45,000 riyals/month); UAE (1= <3,000 Emirati dirhams/month, 6= >45,000 dirhams). A single unit of Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati currency (riyals in Saudi Arabia in Qatar, and dirham in UAE) are each approximately equivalent to 0.28 USD. While the three countries in this study are all high-income nations, there is still considerable income inequality among nationals. For instance, more than 4 million Saudis live in comparative poverty (Lee, 2018). Descriptives for all prospective correlates in each of the three countries are included in the Appendix.

Analyses. Confirmatory Factor Analysis was run using AMOS in SPSS. Results showed that the four INFO items fit well to a unidimensional construct ($\chi 2$=40.2; p<.001; df=2). The Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) was .97. This is above the recommended AGFI of .90. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), .987 and .962 respectively, were also above their recommended thresholds of .90 and .95 (for recommendations see Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). The RMSEA statistic for the model=.077, though in models with small degrees of freedom, like the current four-item model, RMSEA can be over-enlarged (Kenny, Kaniskan & McCoach, 2015), so the SRMR statistic is also reported: .0196. SRMR is an absolute measure of model fit, and SRMRs < .08 indicate well-fitted models. The model demonstrates very strong fit as a unidimensional construct. Table 1 shows inter-item correlations for all possible dyads of scale items, which are all significant, p<.001. Paired-sample t-tests were also run for all dyads, and the mean differences and significance results are also in Table 1 (results section).

In addition to Cronbach's alphas for the INFO scale in the three countries, by language, and by nationalities in the samples, as well as a One-Way ANOVA that compared INFO scores among Arab Gulf nationals, multiple linear regression models were run separately for each country with *INFO* as the outcome variable. A pairwise exclusion of cases in SPSS was used. A multicollinearity threshold of .20 was used, and no predictor had to be removed from models for violating this mark. Non-internet users were included in analyses, as INFO scale items do not specifically reference internet or mobile news use, though when respondents indicate that they check the news in their downtime, most likely do so on mobile devices, especially in the three wealthy, connected countries under study here.

To reduce the likelihood of Type I errors across the three regression models, Bonferroni's correction was used (see Spiegelhalter, 2019), which simply divides the *p*-critical value, in this case .05, by the number of regression models executed (three), which yields a new *p*-critical threshold of .0167. To be deemed significant, then, standardized betas in this study must have *p* <.0167. Betas with .0167<*p*<.05 are labeled as "approaching significance," and are interpreted cautiously.

Results

This study tested a scale measuring the intrinsic need for orientation (INFO) in three countries: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. H1 stated that the scale would achieve robust internal reliability in both Arabic and in English, within each country, and among different nationalities in each country.

H1 was supported. Table 1 shows Cronbach's alphas for the four-item INFO scale for the entire sample, in each country, among nationalities in each country, and by language (Arabic and English). In all but a few cases, the coefficients surpassed the threshold of .70 for internal reliability measured using Cronbach's alpha, and several surpassed .80. According to Taber (2017), Cronbach's alpha values >.70 indicate solid internal reliability in many social science journals, and values >.60 are often acceptable in exploratory work.

The INFO scale achieved maximum internal reliability, such that deleting any of the four items would have lowered Cronbach's alpha from .76—the alpha for all 3,239 respondents—to at least .73. Alpha was higher for non-nationals than for nationals, though the coefficients were >.72 for both groups. The most important reliability coefficients are, arguably, those for the two languages in which surveys were completed, Arabic and English, and these values were .75 and .76, respectively.

Table 1: Cronbach's Alpha & Descriptives for INFO, and Inter-item Correlations for Scale Items

	Alpha	**N**	**M**	**SD**
All respondents	.755	3,239	14.65	3.31
All Nationals	.724	1,254	14.71	3.14
All Non-Nationals	.772	1,985	14.62	3.41
By Language				
Completed survey in Arabic	.755	2,148	14.47	3.43
Completed survey in English	.756	1,091	15.01	3.01
Qatar All	.800	1,120	13.77	4.00
Qatar Nationals	.785	281	13.92	3.91
Qatar Non-Nationals	.805	839	13.72	4.04
UAE All	.693	1,036	15.25	2.69
UAE Nationals	.704	233	14.99	2.88
UAE Non-Nationals	.684	803	15.33	2.63
Saudi All	.690	1,083	15.00	2.82
Saudi Nationals	.686	740	14.92	2.83
Saudi Non-Nationals	.700	343	15.18	2.79

INFO Index Items (All respondents)	Pearson r	M	SD	M-diff.
Keeping up with news connects me to others		3.85	1.0	--
When I have downtime I check news	.52*	3.73	1.05	.119*
I feel discomfort when I don't know what's going on	.42*	3.56	1.1	.287*
One of first things I do each day is check news	.42*	3.51	1.2	.342*
I feel discomfort when I don't know what's going on				
When I have downtime I check news	.39*	--	--	-.167*
One of first things I do each day is check news	.41*	--	--	.055
One of the first things I do each day is check news				
When I have downtime I check news	.483*	--	--	-.223*

*p-value for Pearson r or M-diff. (paired-sample t-test) is less than .001

H2 said news consumption would positively predict respondents' INFO scores, while controlling for other variables in the models. H2 was supported. Table 2 shows standardized betas for media use, media-related attitudinal, and demographic predictors of INFO. Numerous media use variables in Saudi Arabia and the UAE were positive correlates of INFO, and while just two media use factors positively predicted INFO in Qatar—checking news online for leisure/entertainment and saying that news content informs one's entertainment choices—those two variables explained a plurality of total variance in INFO in Qatar. The single strongest predictor of INFO scores in UAE and Qatar was the extent to which respondents use news coverage of entertainment (like film reviews, e.g.) to inform their entertainment media choices. Online news video consumption was also positively associated with INFO in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Table 2: Correlates of Intrinsic Need For Orientation (Standardized Betas)

	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Media Use Predictors			
Check news online for entertainment	.155**	-.008	.093*
Pct. of online video estimated=news .07	.197***	.092*	
Use Twitter	-.014	.09**	-.014
Use Instagram	-.07	-.051	-.035
Use Facebook	-.055	.069~	.057
Use VPN	.072	-.042	*VPN illegal*
News stories inform entertainment choices constitution.	.21***	.142***	.241***
Attitudinal Predictors			
News media in this country credible	.038	.206***	.071
Media in this country can report w/o official interference	-.07	.153***	-.003
Support free speech online	.124*	.081~	.116**
Worry about online surveillance	.003	.083*	.177***
Feels comfortable speaking out abt. politics	.129*	.17***	.174***
Conservatism	.102~	.029	-.178***

Demographic Predictors

National of country	.066	-.038	-.179***
Age	-.09	.036	.006
Gender (Female)	.017	-.059	-.04
Education	.035	.057	-.002
Income	-.062	.02	.152**
Religiosity	.163**	-.056	.065
Adjusted R-square (variance explained)	**15.3%**	**51.0%**	**30.0%**
Min. N / Max. N	663/1,185	747/1,083	615/1,035

*p<.01666667, **p<.01, ***p<.001
~ approaches significance, p<.05

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RQ1 asked about additional key media use variables, attitudes about media topics, and demographic variables that may be associated with intrinsic need for orientation. The models explained a substantial amount of the variance in INFO in Saudi Arabia (52.3%) and the UAE (30.1%), and a moderate amount in Qatar (15%), and most of the variance in all countries was explained by media use variables or media-related attitudes, not demographic factors. If the INFO scale measure is valid, it makes sense that both media use measures and attitudes about censorship and about speaking out about politics are highly predictive of INFO scores.

In all countries, attitudes about media collectively predicted more of the variance in INFO than media use measures or demographic factors. Use of major social media platforms did not predict INFO scores, except in Saudi Arabia, and modestly. News use, with the exception of reading print newspapers for entertainment, was generally positively associated with INFO scores, as was support for freedom of expression and being outspoken about politics.

Support for free speech online and being outspoken about politics were significant predictors of INFO in all countries. Self-identified conservatism was, in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, positively associated with intrinsic need for orientation. A smattering of demographic variables were associated with INFO scores; notably, UAE nationals registered lower INFO scores than non-nationals, and more religiously observant respondents in Qatar reported stronger INFO.

RQ2 asked if Qataris, Saudis, and Emiratis would differ in INFO scores. Qataris reported the lowest INFO scores among the three Arab Gulf nationalities. One-Way ANOVA found significant differences in INFO scores across the three Gulf nationalities $F(2; 1,252)=11.54$, $p <.001$, and that Emiratis and Saudis registered greater INFO scores than Qataris did ($p<.001$ for both comparisons, LSD post-hoc). Emiratis and Saudis did not differ significantly ($p=.777$). Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for nationals and non-nationals in all countries.

Discussion, Limitations, and Subsequent Research

People sometimes refer to themselves or others as newsjunkies, though prior research has not adequately measured an inherent craving for news. Over the years, journalism and communication research examined the gratifications people enjoy from consuming news, but did not examine affinity for news as a broad,

intrinsic psychological characteristic. The goal of this study was to create and test a scale measuring a generalized, intrinsic need to consume news—a measure reliable, valid, and parsimonious enough to be used in studies as an independent or a dependent variable, and in two languages.

Results suggest the intrinsic need-for-orientation scale is sufficiently reliable and valid to accomplish these goals. Robust amounts of variance in INFO scores were explained by the models in the three countries. While the current study validating the INFO measure positions it as an outcome variable, future studies may benefit from using the variable as an independent factor, predicting outcomes such as news consumption and other information-seeking, political efficacy, political knowledge, or intention-to-vote outcomes.

The scale achieved strong reliability across highly diverse samples. While the national populations of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar are somewhat homogenous in religion and language, Islam and Arabic respectively, non-nationals in the Arab Gulf represent some of the most diverse populations in the world. In the data analyzed in this study, non-nationals were mainly citizens of Nepal, the U.S., India, Egypt, Brazil, U.K., Chile, Bangladesh, Malaysia, France, the Philippines, Mexico, and Germany.

Even among such diversity, the INFO scale was sound with regard to internal reliability. Social science indices are often developed in English, and can present internal reliability problems in other languages (Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997). The four-item INFO scale tested here was internally reliable in two of the world's most-used languages: English and Arabic, the latter a non-western language spoken by more than 400 million people (Darwish & Magdy, 2014).

Cronbach's alpha was lower for some subgroups in the samples, primarily Saudis and non-nationals in the UAE. Even so, the lowest reliability figures hovered just below .70. Recent work in psychology and other fields refers to scales with alpha >.60 as acceptable and reliable (Zemeir, Butler & Howard, 2018). Scales with alpha >.70 are increasingly referred to not only as sufficient, but "highly" reliable (see Mishra & Novakowski, 2016). In this study, reliability of the intrinsic need-for-orientation scale was >.70 or >.80 for the majority of subsamples examined.

Providing evidence of convergent validity, INFO was strongly associated with multiple measures of news use as well as media-related attitudes like support for online freedom of speech and political outspokenness. With just a handful of media use measures and media-related attitudes, substantial amounts of variance in INFO scores were explained in the three countries. Consuming news, particularly for the purposes of being entertained and to learn about entertainment options, was significantly associated with INFO, which should be expected if the measure assesses what it purports to. One of the INFO items asks respondents if consuming news makes them feel better connected to other people, and an important way that people connect with others is by consuming entertainment and discussing that entertainment with other people (Anghelcev et al.), so it makes sense that a generalized INFO is correlated with getting news about entertainment offerings.

Contrary to what was hypothesized, Qataris reported the lowest INFO scores. One possible explanation for this could be the small size of Qatar's citizen population, roughly 300,000 (Finn & Irish, 2017), as global news coverage of that

country is lower in volume than for numerous larger countries. Additionally, the country has a shortage of credible news organizations that cover Qatar critically (Martin, 2013). The finding suggests that Qataris are not as interested in news about the Saudi-led blockade, or news in general. *The Media Use in the Middle East* studies have shown Arab nationals, including Qataris, to be vigorous consumers of news. Nonetheless, Saudis and Emiratis may have a stronger intrinsic motivation to consume news about current affairs than Qataris do. Hopefully, the INFO scale will be fielded among other national populations in future studies, and it will be interesting to compare Arab nationals' newsjunkie tendencies to other nationalities.

Is intrinsic need for orientation just another term for need for cognition (NFC)? Not if one considers what NFC actually measures: not a need for news about current events, but rather interest in things like completing puzzles and solving complex problems. Need for cognition is defined classically as the "need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways" (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955, p. 291). However, the 18 items in Cacioppo and Petty's (1984) need-for-cognition scale mostly assess enjoyment in solving tasks and puzzles, rather than a desire to be well-informed. Their scale includes statements like, "I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve" and "[R]elying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me."

This study recommends that the intrinsic need-for-orientation scale be tested in other countries and among other populations, in order to further validate the scale and to learn about conditions under which INFO is influenced by, or influences, behaviors, attitudes, and demographics related to journalism and communication, as well as other social-behavioral characteristics. Lee and Chyi (2014) found that positive beliefs about news coverage of current events contributes to increased motivation to consume news. The current study found that a belief in media credibility was positively associated with INFO in one country, though other attitudes about news reportage specifically might be examined in future research on predictors of INFO scores.

This study also recommends the examination of the relationship between INFO and political knowledge. While news use is positively associated with knowledge about political events (Liu, Shen, Eveland & Dylko, 2013), future research can test whether a strong intrinsic need for orientation also, and uniquely, predicts political knowledge.

It should be noted that while INFO is considered a mostly stable trait that differs among persons, an individuals' INFO can likely increase or decrease over time. Future research might track INFO among adolescents and high school and college students, to see what kinds of predictors are associated with changes in INFO, if any, over time. This study relied on self-reported media use, the accuracy of which can be limited (Prior, 2013), so future research might also examine relationships between INFO and individuals' actual media use using digital-tracking apps and software.

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Appendix

Descriptives for Predictors in Regression Models

	Qatar	KSA	UAE
Check news online for entertainment	M=4.0; SD=1.5	3.8; 1.6	4.5; 1.3
Pct. of online video estimated=news	M=47.3; SD=21	.231.4; 14	34.5; 16.4
Use Twitter	14.7%	44.7	28.8
Use Instagram	32.3%	42.0	51.4
Use Facebook	39.1%	46.9	83.0
Use VPN	38.6%	62%	VPN Illegal
News stories inform entertainment choices	M=4.0; SD=1.1	3.8; .94	4.0; .83
News media in this country credible	M=4.4; SD=.88	3.7; .93	4.01; .85
Media in this country can report w/o official interference	M=3.5; SD=1.4	3.6; 1.04	3.6; 1.1
Support free speech online	M=3.9; SD=1.2	3.7; 1.1	3.5; 1.2
Worry about online surveillance	M=5.4; SD=3.2	7.1; 2.3	6.8; 2.4
Feels comfortable saying what they think about politics	M=3.68; SD=1.3	3.6; 1.1	3.5; 1.03
Conservatism	M=2.78; SD=1.3	2.5; 1.2	2.7; 1.2
National of country	24%	68	22
Age	M=34.2; SD=10.5	33.7; 10.8	33.5; 9.1
Gender (Female)	44%	47	47
Education	Med.=9, finished uni.	8, some uni.	9, finished uni.
Income	Med.=6, 15k-20k/mo.	5, 10k-15k/mo.	6,15k-20k/mo
Religiosity	Med.=3, 1x-2x/year	6, 2x-3x/mo.	4, sev. x/year

Framing Trump's 2016 U.S. presidential election victory: An analysis of the "world press" perspective

Yu-li Chang Zacher[1]

This study examined the editorials and columns from the English-language world press on the moral judgment frame of the lessons learned from Trump's election and the future prospects of the Trump presidency. Mixed methods were chosen as the tool for data analysis – a quantitative content analysis followed by a qualitative narrative analysis to dig deeper into nuances in the thematic frames generated from the content analysis. The findings showed that the world opinion framed Trump's election more unfavorably than favorably with a central narrative relating to the world's concerns over Trump's ability to lead the world to solve its pressing challenges and to do so on moral and cultural grounds. World opinion framed Trump's unpredictable personality and policy ignorance as the largest sources of uncertainty, horror, cataclysm facing the world. World opinion also predicted a degradation of the United States as a beacon of freedom, liberty and democracy because of the resurgent racism, bigotry, xenophobia, and misogyny manifested in Trump and his followers.

Few days after Donald J. Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States on November 8, 2016, newspapers around the world scrambled to churn out front pages, editorials and commentaries to record the unexpected result and its implications for both the United States and the world. This column appeared in the Nigerian newspaper *Punch* on November 11:

> Such is the baggage that Trump carries with him – a chest-thumping, unhinged, divisive figure of unprecedented level of demagoguery and narcissism, whose next move or utterance is wrapped in as much flammable foil as the last. That much was apparent throughout his campaign. Unfortunately for those who fervently wished for a different outcome in the presidential race, that figure is what has now been planted in the most influential government office in the world (Sado, 2016).

The Philippine Daily Inquirer opined in its November 11 editorial this way:

> It is staggering news, because it is possibly the biggest election upset in US history, with serious implications for both American domestic policy and world affairs.… But his election victory is also stunning because of who Trump is: a deeply flawed, indeed abnormal, candidate. It is for the second reason, rather than the first, that many people remain in shock at the result ("Trumped," 2016).

As the world audience grappled with the surprising turns of events, journalists moved quickly to provide meaning by analyzing and interpreting the causes for

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Trump's victory, solutions for the Trump administration to move forward and lessons to be learned from the election. What some of those journalists may or may not have realized while analyzing, interpreting and ultimately framing the 2016 election is political scientist Entman's (2004) assertion that "framing is an inescapable feature of representation and that increases the political influence of the media" (p. 21). In addition, framing strategies, especially during political elections, are most explicit in political editorials and commentaries because they are written to express opinions on important topics without being bound by the conventional norm of objectivity (Chang & Chang, 2003; Eilder & Lüter, 2000; Gamson, 1989).

Framing involves a measure of moral judgment. Consequently, the main purpose of this study is to determine the moral judgment frames that were most dominant in selected English-language newspapers' opinions around the globe, in relation to the 2016 U.S. presidential election result and its implications for the future of the presidency.

Mass Media, Framing and Editorial Opinion

Mass media actively set the frames of reference readers use to interpret and discuss news events. Thus, the way media frame certain issues can affect people's perceptions of those issues and influence public opinions (Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). A news frame can be conceptualized as "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events.… The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p.143)." Such frames also guide the working routines for journalists or news organizations to organize, interpret, and present information for efficient relay to their audience (Entman, 1993; Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980).

As a theory, framing suggests that journalists use news frames to simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow of events. In the process of selecting to prioritize some facts or developments of an event over others, journalists make moral judgment and promote a particular interpretation of that event (Entman, 1993).

Upon conducting a comprehensive study of media framing research, Matthes (2009) found that Entman's definition of media frames was the most influential among various definitions. Entman (1993) defined "media frames" as referring to some aspects of a perceived reality made more salient in a communication text to "promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (p. 52)." In other words, news framing in media's coverage of political events has four basic functions -- defining the problem, identifying causes, conveying moral judgment, and prescribing remedies (Entman, 2004). Previous research also indicated that the moral judgment frame on lessons to be learned from major world events could stand out among all these functions. Chang and Zacher (2014) examined the causal responsibility, moral judgment and treatment remedy frames in their study of the framing of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and found that most editorials emphasized the moral responsibility frame during the Arab Spring revolution.

Editorials and Columns Vs News in Framing Analysis

This study relied on editorials and columns instead of news reports because political

"framing" is most obvious in opinion pieces. Gamson (1989, p. 158) argued that to "identify frames, the information content of news reports is less important than interpretative commentary that surrounds it." News reports are represented by the newspaper's interpretation of reality based on factual accounts or summaries of events; editorials and columns express opinions and provide evaluations of reality to their readers (Rupar, 2007). Editorials are the only place in a newspaper where the views of the paper as an organization are represented. In freely selecting and presenting issues according to their own agenda, editorials take an active role in engaging the public in the deliberations and discourse of politics (Firmstone, 2008).

Editorials and columns are persuasive instruments used to influence public opinion; therefore, researching them can make a significant contribution to the understanding of the relationship between the press and politics (Chang & Zacher, 2014; Eilder & Lüter, 2000; Firmstone, 2008; Rojecki, 2008; Ryan, 2004).

Extrinsic Factors in International News Research

Research on international news coverage can help explain what factors might have affected global opinion on the moral judgment frame of Trump's victory. Scholars have studied two lines of factors affecting international news coverage or flow: "intrinsic" or "event-related" factors, referring to newsworthiness such as human interest, deviance, prominence/importance, conflict/controversy, timeliness, and proximity (Chang et al, 1987; Cooper-Chen, 2001; Wanta & Chang, 2001); and "extrinsic" or "context-related" factors, referring to trade relations, diplomatic and military ties, cultural similarities, or political variables such as political freedom, press freedom and geopolitical regions (Adams, 1986; Ahern, 1984; Chang & Zacher, 2014; Ishii, 1996; Kim & Barnett, 1996; Wu, 2000).

Due to the political nature of Trump's election and its implications for geopolitical power alignments, this study focused on the extrinsic variable of geopolitical region. Countries in a region often share some common religious, political or ethnic origins and similar strategic interests. The controversies over the future of NATO, NAFTA, Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic trade agreements and ISIS all indicated how geopolitics could dominate the framing of Trump's election and an ensuing Trump administration.

Research Questions

Based on the framing theoretical framework, this study aimed to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What were the dominant frames used by the sample English-language newspaper opinion pieces on the moral judgment of Trump's victory and his presidency?

RQ2: Did the extra-media factor of geopolitical region affect how these opinion pieces framed the moral judgment of Trump's victory and his presidency?

RQ3: What were the narratives surrounding the dominant frames as reflected in RQ1?

Methodology

This study adopted mixed methods as its methodology, more specifically a quantitative content analysis followed by a qualitative narrative analysis. Mixed methods research has been established as a field of methodology for over 30 years and has been recognized as the third major research approach after quantitative research and qualitative research (Creswell, 2015; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner 2007). While mixed methods research has taken on different labels over the years – triangulation or multiple operationalism (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Denzie, 1978; Morse, 1991), blended research (Thomas, 2003), integrative research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), and multimethod research (Hunter & Brewer, 2003; Morse, 2003) -- it basically entails "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzie, 1978, p. 291), and it integrates quantitative and qualitative data and then "draws interpretations based on the combined strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems" (Creswell, 2015, p. 20).

Strengthening the research results is the major rationale behind the mixed methods approach. According to Sieber (1973), when analyzing data, qualitative data can enrich the findings by clarifying, describing and interpreting quantitative results. Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) used the term "complementarity" – seeking clarification, elaboration and enhanced understanding of the results from one method with results from the other method -- to refer to the advantage of mixed method research. As far as the type of mixed methods research, this study employed sequential triangulation (Morse, 1991) or explanatory sequential design (Creswell, 2015), in which the study began with a quantitative method and then used a qualitative approach to explain the quantitative results. For this study, qualitative narrative analysis added depth to the elaboration and interpretation of the quantitative findings of the most dominant moral judgment frames.

Quantitative Content Analysis

Sampling. Newspaper editorials and columns published between November 9 and November 13, 2016 (or November 10 to November 14 for different time zones), about the election of Donald Trump were mostly drawn from individual newspaper websites right after the election. In addition, Lexis-Nexis Academic database was supplemented to retrieve more articles by using the search terms of "Trump" and "editorial," "column," or "opinion."

For countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada, India, and South Africa with larger numbers of English-language newspapers, only those with large circulations and a national focus in their coverage were chosen. Initially 622 articles were collected. After eliminating those that mentioned Trump but did not opine on the moral implications of his presidency, 484 opinion pieces, representing 34 countries, were retained for analysis (see Table 1). In a few cases where the same opinion piece appeared in two or multiple newspapers, it was counted as two or more because the same article reached different audiences.

Table 1: Opinion Articles by Region and Country

Region	Country	N (number)
Africa	Kenya	23
	Namibia	1
	Nigeria	9
	South Africa	39
	Tanzania	7
	Zambia	1
Americas	Bermuda	2
	Canada	31
	Jamaica	19
Asia	China	4
	India	26
	Indonesia	7
	Japan	6
	South Korea	10
	Malaysia	8
	Pakistan	9
	Philippines	25
	Singapore	11
	Sri Lanka	4
	Taiwan	7
	Thailand	4
	Australia	58
	New Zealand	30
N/Africa & Middle East	Israel	19
	Lebanon	7
	Qatar	2
	Saudi Arabia	23
	UAE	33
Europe	Cyprus	2
	Ireland	16
	Malta	1
	Russia	2
	Turkey	2
	United Kingdom	36

Moral judgment frame. The unit of analysis is an opinion article. The recording unit is the mention of a theme. This frame referred to the opinion piece's stance on what could be learned from the election of Donald Trump and what his presidency could entail for both the United States and the world. This issue-specific frame was derived by following Matthes' (2009) suggestion of conducting an initial exploratory analysis of a sample of the articles. This step yielded three big categories -- favorable/positive, unfavorable/negative and mixed – and major

themes under each category.

Favorable opinions included the following themes: (1) Trump is a dealmaker or go-getter; (2) Trump may change with the help of staff; (3) Trump era signifies the anti-establishment, anti-Obama sentiment and/or hope for change in domestic policies; (4) U.S. domestic institutions are strong enough to withstand Trump; (5) Forming a different set of international rules may prove beneficial; (6) The U.S. has the capacity to maintain strong leadership role in world affairs; and (7) Other.

Unfavorable opinions included the following themes: (1) Trump presidency invokes concerns for the ideas and values of democracy; (2) Trump's personality or competence (untruthfulness, divisiveness, narcissism, ignorance, unpredictability) causes concern; (3) Trump presidency invokes concern for changes in domestic policies (healthcare, education, climate change, job creation, immigration, tax reform); (4) Trump presidency invokes concern for racism, bigotry, xenophobia, sexism, misogyny; (5) Trump presidency invokes concern for U.S. leadership role in regional/world affairs; (6) Trump presidency means a lost opportunity for a female president; and (7) Other. The category of mixed opinion included all of the thematic items from favorable and unfavorable opinions.

Extrinsic factor – geopolitical regions. Countries were grouped into five geopolitical regions by using the old World Press Review's classifications: Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and the Americas.

Statistical procedures. The study unit is the opinion article. The recording unit is the entire article for the variables of favorable, unfavorable and mixed moral judgment frame and the extrinsic factor of geopolitical region. The two coders read each article as a whole to get a general impression of the language, description and tone of the article for favorable, unfavorable or mixed moral judgment. Forty randomly selected articles were used to test inter-coder reliability. It yielded the following coefficients: .94 for favorable frame, .91 for unfavorable frame and .91 for mixed frame.

Qualitative Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis, according to Fisher (1984), refers to "a theory of symbolic actions -- words and/or deeds -- that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, and interpret them" (p. 2). Building on this concept, Connelly and Clandinin (1990) said that "people by nature lead storied lives and tell stories of those lives, whereas narrative researchers describe such lives, collect and tell stories of them, and write narratives of experience" (p. 2).

Journalists, being storytellers, perform an important cultural function of meaning making for the society by transforming abstract, inexplicable information into structured and digestible stories with clear narratives (Barkin, 1984; Bird & Dardenne, 1997; Su, 2014). In this process, the readers are able to detect the themes of news narratives based on their experiences and judge the stories based on their values and logic (Barkin, 1984; Fisher, 1985; Caldiero, 2007). Previous research has also shown that popular figures' lives as depicted in news narratives are told "in a remarkably uniform narrative" that draws moral lessons to be learned for the readers (Kitch, 2007, p. 37).

Critically analyzing and interpreting the narratives surrounding the dominant

moral judgment frame about Trump's presidency would give the readers a more in-depth understanding of global opinion about him and his presidency. Analyzing the narratives involved three steps: (a) filtering newspaper articles containing the dominant themes from the whole dataset for multiple in-depth readings, (b) focusing on content that specifically reflects the dominant themes in each filtered article, (c) grouping the narrative types into thematic categories based on their shared properties and dimensions.

Findings

Quantitative Content Analysis

The quantitative content analysis showed that 58% (n = 279) of the 484 opinion pieces reflected an unfavorable frame on the Trump presidency, while 23% gave a favorable view (n = 110) and 20% opted for a more moderate, mixed view (n = 95). Of those with unfavorable mentions, three themes stood out – concern for U.S. global leadership role (25%), Trump's character/competence (23%), and racism, xenophobia and misogyny embedded in anti-establishment/anti-Obama sentiment (22%) (see Table 2).

Table 2: Themes under Unfavorable Framing (Count of Mentions)

Theme (Concerns for…)	Count	Percentage
World Leadership	168	25.04%
Trump's Character/ Competence	153	22.80%
Racism, Bigotry/ Xenophobia, Misogyny	150	22.35%
Domestic Policy	119	17.73%
Democratic Values	62	9.24%
The Rest	19	2.83%
Total	671	100%

Of those with favorable mentions, the dominant theme was the reckoning of the anti-establishment, anti-Obama sentiment among the electorate (52%) (see Table 3).

Table 3: Themes under Favorable Framing (Count of Mentions)

Theme (Concerns for…)	Count	Percentage
Awaking/Reckoning of Anti-establishment sentiment	78	52%
Different way of engaging allies	18	12%
Trump may change	15	10%
Democratic institutions strong enough	15	10%
Trump being a dealmaker	12	8%
US maintaining strong world leadership	10	6.66%
Other	2	1.33%
Total	671	100%

The mixed opinions reflected a similar pattern of combining the dominant themes in the unfavorable category (Trump character/competence -- 17%, concern for anti-establishment/anti-Obama sentiment -- 14%, and concern for U.S. leadership in regional and world politics -- 12%) and the favorable category (reckoning of anti-establishment, anti-Obama sentiment: -- 27%).

To answer RQ1, this study found that more than half of the opinion in the world's English-language newspapers conveyed moral judgment (58%) of the Trump presidency in an unfavorable light. Favorable and mixed framing accounted for 23% and 20% respectively.

Table 4 indicated the breakdown of favorable, unfavorable and mixed moral judgment by geopolitical regions. The results showed that all regions had more than half of their opinion articles framing the Trump presidency in an unfavorable light, with Africa leading (73%) and Europe having the least (51%). The reverse was the case in favorable framing of Trump's presidency, with Europe leading (32%) and Africa having the least (13%). On the mixed framing category, the Americas led with 33% while the Middle East was the least with 12% (see Table 4).

Table 4: Favorable/Unfavorable/Mixed Framing of Each Geographic Regions (Count of Articles)

Region	Favorable	Unfavorable	Mixed	Total
Africa	12.5% (n = 10)	72.5% (n = 58)	15.0% (n = 12)	100% (n = 80)
Middle East	23.8% (n =20)	64.3% (n =54)	11.9% (n = 10)	100% (n = 84)
Asia	25.4% (n = 53)	52.6% (n = 110)	22.0% (n = 46)	100% (n = 209)
Americas	15.4% (n = 8)	51.9% (n = 27)	32.7% (n = 17)	100% (n = 52)
Europe	32.2% (n = 19)	50.8% (n = 30)	16.9% (n=10)	100% (n = 59)

To answer RQ2, this study found that the pattern of unfavorable moral judgment frame toward the Trump presidency differed, based on geographical location. Africa has the most articles with unfavorable moral judgment frame (73%), while Europe had the most favorable frame (32%) and the Americas has the most mixed frame (33%).

Qualitative Narrative Analysis
To answer RQ3, the narrative of the moral judgment frames from the 2016 U.S. presidential election centered on two dimensions. First, Trump's unpredictability was regarded as the indicator that he was unfit to lead the world to tackle its immediate challenges. Second, the perceived character flaws embedded in some of his racist and misogynistic utterances appeared to shatter the belief in America's moral authority to lead the rest of the world.

Trump being unfit to lead the world. This editorial from *The Guardian* in Britain reflected the apprehensions of the global community:

Mr. Trump's win means uncertainty about America's future strategy in a world that has long relied on the United States for stability. But Mr. Trump's capacity to destabilise is almost limitless. His military, diplomatic, security, environmental and trade policies all have the capacity to change the world for the worse. Americans have done a very dangerous thing this week. Because of what they have done we all face dark, uncertain and fearful times ("The Guardian view on President-elect Donald Trump: A dark day for the world," 2016).

Other newspapers used terms such as "horror," "cataclysm," "mayhem," and "havoc" to convey the same fears. Here is a sample of articles: "Trump's election is a political cataclysm. It is Brexit on steroids" (Probyn, 2016). "It is quite clear the

man is a warmonger, going by his view of the world" ("Is US poll rigged?" 2016). "What horrors are in store for us during the reign of President Trump is anyone's guess, but he will have all the tools at his disposal to wreak havoc on our rights here at home and countless lives of those abroad" (Timm, 2016).

Trade and economy issues topped the list of global concerns about the new Trump administration. The concerns were mainly about: impending tariff wars between the United States and China; U.S. withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement and a levy of 35% tariffs on Mexican imports; halting negotiations on both the Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic trade agreements; and the threat to sideline global trade organizations such as World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund (Bildt, 2016; "A bumpy ride ahead," 2016; "Donald Trump win casts a cloud on the future," 2016; Koukoulas, 2016; Martin, 2016; McGeough, 2016; Quah & Crabtree, 2016; "Trump has the British example to look at and derive lessons from," 2016; "Trump politics continue a Lankan role," 2016; "Trump win will be a challenge for Canada, and the world," 2016; Zhao, 2016).

Other concerns were about returning to a period of worldwide depression not unlike the Great Depression in the 1930s under President Herbert Hoover, when the United States imposed tariffs on more than 20,000 imported goods and turned what could have been a short U.S. recession into a global depression that accelerated the march toward WWII (Heath, 2016; Hutton, 2016).

In geopolitics and global defense, Trump's isolationist posture as reflected in his campaign rhetoric caused the most concern, especially on Trump's promise to backtrack on U.S. membership in NATO and his intention to form a cozy relationship with Russian President Putin, who could be emboldened for aggression (Bremmer, 2016; Champion & Wadhams, 2016; Evans, 2016; Gillespie, 2016; "Into uncharted water with no compass," 2016; Kechichian, 2016; Leonard, 2016; "Victory for Trump: God save America," 2016; Wolffe, 2016). His response to North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons -- demanding South Korea and Japan contribute more financially to the cost of U.S. protection and encouraging both countries to pursue nuclearization also caused consternation around the world (Quah & Crabtree, 2016; Han, 2016; Hickey, 2016; Mason, R., 2016; "Trump win will be a challenge for Canada, and the world," 2016).

Trump's isolationist foreign policy, according to the world opinion, would mark the greatest seismic shift in global politics since the end of WWII. This concern was expressed in the *Gulf News,* a newspaper published in the United Arab Emirates:

> In general, Trump is likely to possess a totally different vision of the US role in the world than Obama and Clinton and even other Democratic and Republican presidents for the last few decades: A zero-sum world of winner and losers, a contractual approach towards alliances based on allies providing certain benefits to the United States (such as cash, more preferential trade deals or defence contracts) in exchange for the perceived privilege of American protection or support and no concerns about some regimes' human rights treatment (Anderson, 2016).

Other pieces also opined on this transactional, bottom-line approach in foreign policy, which would lead to diminishing roles of NATO, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (McGeough, 2016; "Victory for Trump: God save America," 2016).

Trump shattering belief in America's moral authority in leading the world.
The second indicator in the qualitative findings is about Trump's character flaws that could jeopardize U.S. leadership in exercising "soft power." Soft power, according to Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, who coined the term in 1990, arose from its culture and political values being attractive to the rest of the world and its foreign policies being seen as legitimate and having moral authority. The sentiments of racism, sexism, xenophobia, misogyny Trump had aroused in his supporters signified that the United States had lost its legitimacy as a beacon for freedom, liberty and democracy as epitomized by Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy (Lister, 2016; Rachman, 2016; Sado, 2016; Salazar, 2016; Tharoor, 2016; Thompson, 2016).

The following column from Kenya's *Daily Nation* lamented the loss of U.S. leadership on moral grounds:

> His triumph has thrust to the center-stage of global politics an angry people who were previously written off as a small irrational, ignorant, racist, xenophobic, nativist, reactionary and angry people in the fringes of the American and other Western societies…. As President-elect, Trump's abrasive style has eroded America's soft power as its most powerful asset in global leadership, leaving the world without a credible leader (Kagwanja, 2016).

The same sentiment was reflected in the following column published in the *Jerusalem Post* in Israel:

> Although the US is only the latest Western nation to fall prey to the predations of populism, its status as the leader of the free, democratic world and the wellspring of democracy make its fall from grace even more alarming.
>
> Moreover, if such a beacon of liberty can fall so low, what hope is there for the remaining, beleaguered democracies of Europe which can now no longer rely on the support of the US in light of Trump and his isolationist instincts?... To whom can democracies and aspiring democracies look now? Trump's election has given an enormous tailwind within the democratic world to the notion that a political strongman can bulldoze through the complex problems of the 21st century (Sharon, 2016).

The degradation of the United States as the shining symbol of the world's leading "soft power" was mostly attributed to resurgent, lingering racism and misogyny manifested in Trump and his followers (Cheeseman, 2016; Freedland, 2016; Freeman, 2016; Jazbhay, 2016; Mason, P., 2016; Murunga, 2016; Reyes, 2016; "Trump's election likely to shake the world – and badly," 2016; West, 2016).

Most world opinion also remained pessimistic about Trump being transformed by the weight of the highest office into a more presidential leader of the world (Friedman, 2016; McKenna, 2016; O'Mahony, 2016; Wente, 2016). "He never did, and surely he will see his victory as proof that he was always right, that his instincts are perfect and never to be challenged. There is no reason for him to moderate at all. The office of Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy is now his playpen. He can do what he likes" (Freedland, 2016). "Trump will soon realize that winning the race was the real fun. Actually, being a president is a lot of work, no matter how much he plans to delegate. Trump can't file for bankruptcy when it becomes obvious that he didn't have sufficient capital to meet the demand of the presidency and deliver on his electoral promises. He'll just be a big-time loser" (Cooper, 2016).

Discussion and Conclusion

Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election offered an excellent opportunity to look into how the world press responded to the surprise outcome of the election. Using Entman's (2004) discussion on framing news reports, this study focused on the moral judgment frame, that is, the lessons learned from Trump's election and the future prospects of the Trump presidency. As shown in previous research, news framing is most obvious in opinion pieces; therefore, this study sampled and examined newspaper editorials and columns from the English-language print media around the globe. The mixed research method was chosen for data analysis because the quantitative content analysis could provide objectivity and reliability when systematically sorting through a large amount of data, and the qualitative narrative analysis could allow more in-depth readings to find out nuances in the thematic frames generated from the content analysis.

The findings showed that the world opinion as reflected in the editorials and columns of the English-language newspapers analyzed in this study framed President Trump's election more unfavorably than favorably. All geopolitical regions adopted the unfavorable frame more than 50% of the times. Among them, Africa carried the highest percentage of unfavorable coverage. This finding didn't seem surprising if taking into account of Trump's campaign rhetoric of racism, especially toward people of African descent, and his threats of cutting aid to Africa. While the U.S. foreign policies toward Africa under the Bush and Obama administrations were criticized for falling short, Bush had gotten high praise for expanding foreign aid to Africa such as the AIDS relief fund. Obama had cut funding to Africa in response to the budget crunch imposed by the recession, but he was regarded as one of their own because of his Kenyan heritage.

Digging deeper into the unfavorable frame of Trump's presidency, this study discovered a central narrative relating to the world's concerns over Trump's ability to lead the world to solve its pressing challenges and to do so on moral and cultural grounds. Most of the opinion articles and editorials used in this study framed Trump's unpredictable personality and being a novice on policy matters as the greatest sources of uncertainty facing the world. Trump was viewed not only as being incapable of leading the world to solve its problems but also as being capable of further complicating the uncertainties that had already afflicted the world. The opinions also predicted a degradation of the United States as a beacon of freedom, liberty and democracy because of the resurgent racism, bigotry, xenophobia and misogyny manifested in speeches by the president and his followers.

This study investigated global opinion at a significant point in world history – the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States -- through an examination of English-language newspaper opinion articles across the world. The findings demonstrate that newspaper editorials and columns can serve as ideal forums to engage in news framing to reinforce or change public opinion, especially how such opinions reflect moral judgment on an important contemporary issue and event.

Another important aspect of this study is that it attempted to include all geopolitical regions. This was done in the belief that geographical regions ought to be taken into account when analyzing global opinion on an issue that has tremendous international implications.

Finally this study contributes to the strength and increasing usefulness of the qualitative narrative analysis, which provides a deeper layer of critical interpretation into findings that are based on a quantitative content analysis in order to fully explain the issue being researched.

In spite of the importance of this study and what it contributes to the overall body of knowledge, it has its limitations. First, several countries are not represented in this study because they do not publish English newspapers or their English newspapers are not available in databases or available freely online. Second, while editorials and columns in English newspapers in non-English-speaking countries can mirror elite opinions, they may not be a complete representation of the overall public opinion. Third, the sample for the study is skewed toward English-speaking countries such as the Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland, and South Africa because of the wider availability of English newspapers in those countries.

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Understanding the role of indigenous festivals in Community Development: A study of the Awaka community (Nigeria)

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There is a presupposition that indigenous knowledge has no relevance to development communication in this technological age. Thus, focusing on the indigenous knowledge theory, this study ascertained the development opportunities the Oka festival presents to the people of Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria and the challenges facing the festival. Six (6) focus group sessions were held with Forty-eight (48) festival attendees who were recruited through the snowball sampling method. The traditional ruler of the town and four of his chiefs were also interviewed. Results show the importance of indigenous knowledge in community development as the festival was said to have a plethora of communication activities that aimed at generating development for the people. The study calls for synergy between indigenous knowledge and modern knowledge (the integrated model of communication) in community development.

Keywords: Awaka-Owerri, Oka festival, community development, indigenous knowledge communication systems, integrated communication model, snowball sampling method.

The word, *festival*, is derived from the root, "feast" or "fiesta." It refers to celebration evolving from ancient to modern times as specific days or periods set aside as milestones for the celebrating communities. Such celebrations involve local cultures, mores, religion and urban or rural ways of life (Skoultsos, 2014).

Traditional festivals have been in existence for decades in several indigenous communities across the globe. For instance, there are over seventy key festivals and carnivals in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, according to a 2017 report by its National Council for Arts and Culture. Most of these festivals predate the advent of Christianity and Islam and have survived to date. Among the most popular of these festivals, which also serve as huge tourist attractions and revenue earner for the states in which they are held, are the Eyo (Lagos State) , Arugungu (Kebbi State) Ahiajoku and Ikeji (Imo State), Durbar (Jigawa State), Calabar festival (Cross River State) and Carneeriv Festival (Rivers State) (Adah, Chinekelu & Chiama 2014; Lawrence-Hart, 2014). In addition to these traditional festivals, Nigerians also celebrate non-indigenous religious festivals, especially those related to Christianity (Easter) and Islam (Eid al-Fitri), the two most prominent religions in the country.

In the classical and cultural-anthropological perspective, Falassi (1987, p.2) defined a festival as "a sacred or profane time of celebration, marked by special observances." Festivals are therefore events used to celebrate community values, ideologies, identity and continuity. In line with the modern approach of naming all events as festivals, Getz (2005 p.21), defined them as "themed, public celebrations" while Lawrence-Hart (2014) citing the American Heritage Dictionary (2009) defines

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festivals as events of merriment that involve cultural performances, exhibitions and competitions, and which take place at intervening periods. Nonetheless, Pieper (1965) opined that only religious rituals and celebrations could be called festivals.

What emerges from these approaches to understanding the meaning of festivals is that the concept is susceptible to multiple definitions across and even within cultures. This invariably means that a festival can assume various forms, events and themes, thus making the term subject to being misapplied and commercialized. Although festivals have been in existence in various communities for decades if not centuries, little research has been done on how people use festivals for development purposes.

In this study, and irrespective of the paradigm used to define it, development refers to the process of economic, social, cultural and political growth and improvement that culminates in transforming people's quality and quantity of life (Muhi, Panopio & Salcedo 1993; Soola, 2003; Anaeto & Anaeto, 2010). In this regard, the quality of life encompasses the availability of opportunities for growth, while the quantity of life connotes the amount of economic and political participation. Thus, development in this context implies a change from an unsatisfactory living or life's condition to something better.

The purpose of the current study, therefore, is to examine the extent to which the Oka festival has been used for community development among the Awaka people found in Imo State, who are geographically located in the south eastern part of Nigeria. The Awaka belong to the Igbo ethnic group, one of the three largest ethnic communities in Nigeria. Overall, this study examines the challenges of using festivals as the engines of community development in the Awaka community.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria is a country in dire need of development. The majority of the Nigerian populace dwell in rural areas that require development. They have been cut off from urban life (Isola, 2010) and have been so rendered voiceless that the media hardly report issues regarding their lives and standard of living (Isola, 2010; Isika, 2011). Nonetheless, people-centered development initiatives need to examine the traditional means of communication in rural communities in order to help fast- track development in these areas.

In spite of the erosion of many traditional/cultural values, some traditional practices, including festivals are still recognized and observed in several parts of Nigeria. These festivals have the potential for engendering development because they are participatory and allow for bi-directional sharing of ideas by people in a non-elitist and egalitarian manner. This accounts for why this study is principally focused on such festivals. Besides, a lot of research on festivals tends to examine their political and socio-cultural meanings, while little attention is paid to their developmental potential.

This study was therefore conceptualized to highlight the role of traditional and cultural festivals towards rural development in countries such as Nigeria with enormous developmental challenges. It was also conceptualized to explore the most effective ways to communicate the need for development to people who are not well exposed to other means of communication, or cannot afford to subscribe to modern communication technologies. An underlying proposition in this study is that overall western communicative approaches have not yielded expected

results especially in rural areas in developing nations (Isola 2010; Umoh, 2010). To overcome this shortcoming, a number of suggestions have been offered by various scholars, including the use of traditional means of communication which people in these rural areas are used to. Umoh (2010, p.22), for instance, articulated this idea by asserting that, "The bias of new development thinking is towards the rural poor, the destitute, the elderly, children and women who have historically been excluded and unreached by development workers, services and messages."

Literature Review & Theory

Several studies have attempted to establish the inherent relationship between culture, and development (Muhi, Panopio, & Salcedo; 1993; Anaeto, & Anaeto, 2010; Osuagwu, 2010; Umoh, 2010). Culture is preserved, sustained, enlivened and passed on to future generations through communication (Isola, 2010; Umoh, 2010; Ozuru & Ekeanyanwu, 2013). Festivals, on their part, are some of the prominent components of culture. They belong to the intangible genre of culture just like language, oral tradition, custom, music, dance and rituals (Isola, 2010). Their importance cannot be overemphasized as they, unlike some other aspects of culture, are not only publicly celebrated but in some societies are marked as annual events.

Some scholars have noted that genuine development is often driven through the application of people's cultural values (Ade-ajayi, 2002; Isola, 2010). Isola (2010, p. 20) specifically noted that:

> It is the intangible cultural heritage that inculcates in our minds such important moral values as honesty, probity, accountability, sincerity, human fellow feeling, justice, transparency, love and caring. If all these moral values can be retrieved, our tangible development like building roads, houses, dams, and providing services will be faster and more solid.

It is only recently that some scholars, especially in the developing world, are beginning to expound the benefits festivals hold for community development, and have condemned westernized approaches to development in Africa as having been forced on the people. These scholars are challenging the traditional top-down approaches that lack human quality and ignore the values upon which most traditional societies are built (Isika, 2011; Isola, 2010; Nwamuo, 2011; Umoh 2010).

This new thinking and theoretical approach to development is also non-generic and emphasizes learning through the intangible aspects of culture (Isola, 2010). For instance, Isola (2010, p. 5) submits that the captivating songs and chants during festivals have played cleansing roles in communities and served as the "moral police that helps maintain sanity in the cultural ecosystem." Everybody, irrespective of status can be reprimanded through songs thereby bringing about attitude change and a mindset that is more development and reform oriented.

Isika (2011, p. 179) also examined another aspect of culture, the importance of proverbs and idiophones using historical documents and survey methods. The study which was about the Igbo ethnic group in Nigeria, found that important moral lessons like love, friendliness, self-respect, and esteem, honesty and truthfulness, unity, patriotism and nationalism and motivation for social development were promoted through such oral traditions as proverbs, music and idiophones, which have often led to positive social change as "they led the society aright" (p.179).

According to Asema (2011, p.109), "culture provides the basic form of the many ceremonies and rituals of social life…" Anaeto (2011) also noted that the suitability of traditional media for community development is in the fact that situations are put into familiar contexts for people in given communities through the use of their local language.

The term, cultural deterioration, is often used to describe as cultural erosion because even some aspects of what can be loosely described global culture consumed by people in various cultures and communities, do not take cognizance of the peculiarities of other cultures. It rather turns culture into what O'Conner (1990) described as "pseudo cultures" which invariably weaken the cultural coherence of other nations (Ang, 2007). Some scholars have also argued that even global news agencies are impeding the development of countries in the developing regions of the world through cultural imperialism, ethnocentrism, global information imbalance which can only be solved if nations looked inward for their development (Iwokwagh & Akogwu, 2008).

It is against this backdrop that the quest for ethnic recognition has made the festival an important aspect of people's lives. There is no gainsaying that festival is an observable cultural communicative activity that aesthetically allows the expression of group unity and identity. Thus, some studies have focused on the festival as a communicative performance as seen through the social interactions that take place during such events (Kuutma, 1998; Lawrence-Hart, 2014). As Lawrence- Hart (2014) also observed, the potential for a festival to enhance development is evident in its attribute of promoting intercultural understanding through communication.

According to Anaeto and Anaeto (2010, p.74) "community development is the active involvement of community members in issues and problems that affect their lives." Ndolo and Ozoh (2013) see community development as the efforts of a community at adding capacity to the efforts of the government for both human and infrastructural development. Thus, it is an active process where all members of the community are involved in their development. The concept of rural development refers to efforts aimed at improving the living conditions of people whose neighborhoods are nonurban (Asemah, 2011). The target in both concepts is to actively and constructively reduce the prevalence of sickness, poverty and heavy reliance on government.

Some scholars have also in their research noted the role of festivals in promoting intra and intercultural cohesion. For instance, a study by Ubaku (2013) found that festivals help in promoting community cohesion among the Igbo people in the south east of Nigeria. Earlier, Asemah (2011, p.337) observed that "...through festivals, for example, different aspects of a cultural system is exposed to other cultures leading to greater understanding and appreciation of differences."

It is equally noteworthy that other scholars have prescribed the combination of both traditional and mass modes of communication (trado-modern) for development because the traditional modes are still very functional in the rural areas (Iwokwagh, & Akogwu, 2008; Nawagbara, 2009; Orhungun & Iwokwagh, 2009; Isika, 2010; Asemah, 2011; Lakew, 2013). Such an approach as evident in C4D (communication for development) activities, according to Lakew (2013), engenders bottom level or bottom-up participation beyond being deployed for developmental purposes; they can also be used for the promotion of a community's cultural heritage.

Brief history of Awaka and Oka Festival

Awaka is a town situated on a small hill about four miles north-east of its larger city, Owerri, in Nigeria's Imo State. It is one of the five communities that make up Owerri also referred to as *Alaenyi.* The town belongs to the old *Alaenyi* clan, a homogeneous lineage, which broke into five autonomous communities. The other communities from that clan include *Ihitta-Ogada, Egbu, Naze and Owere-Nchi-Ise.* Awaka comprises three villages known as Nde-Egbelu, Umuodu and Amuzi. The town is under the leadership of His Royal Highness Eze *Akujobi* David-*Osuagwu* the Ezikoche II, who inherited the throne from his uncle, HRH Eze Chris David-*Osuagwu* around 1993.

Awaka town derived its name from its major farm produce, Oka (corn) which is said to be the most delicious in the state. Thus, Oka festival previously known as Onwa oru, Ita Oka Awaka, or Onwu Awaka is an annual cultural festival in Awaka.

Awaka traditional government is hierarchical. It runs from the Eze (the traditional ruler) to the *Nde Oha* (Council of Elders) to the village heads. The Council of Elders comprises the eldest man in each kindred who must be conferred the title of Oha (the most senior male) by *Oha Awaka* Traditional Council. The council, in conjunction with the state government, installs the traditional ruler of the town. The Age grades, a system of *organisation* comprising a group of people who were born within the same period, sometimes pass the information on critical decisions to their members.

The Oka festival is celebrated in August to usher in the harvest season. It is an important festival that also attracts people from neighboring states. According to Ourtravelandtour.com (2019), the festival is ranked 35 out of 69 major festivals in Igboland. It is often organized by indigenes of the community led by their traditional ruler whose official title is *Eze.* The festival further serves as a platform to showcase the rich cultural traditions of the Awaka people, expressed in dance, masquerades, music and agricultural heritage of the people. During the festival, the people dress in all forms of resplendent and gorgeous attires usually handwoven, with the impression of a special species of *oka Awaka (Awaka corn),* the town is known for, because of its huge size and delicious taste.

Theory

Some alternative theories of development that suggest national self-reliance on local participation and people-oriented development are relevant to this study. They include the self-reliance theory, participatory model of development and the indigenous knowledge paradigm, which is used in this study.

The indigenous knowledge paradigm was propounded by Michael Warren, an Iowa State University professor who applied it to agriculture and rural development. The model was later developed and applied in health, nutrition and other research areas (Anaeto & Anaeto, 2010).

The indigenous knowledge model later became very popular and was so widely used in a variety of studies that renowned organizations like the World Bank and UNESCO adopted it as a valuable tool in fast-tracking development assistance in the developing world (Awodiya, 2013). The model explains the way members of a given community identify problems and seek solutions to them in their local way. It has the triple tenets of human value model of development which emphasizes self-reliance, liberation and popular participation as evident in people's ability for

authentic decision making as equals as opposed to the usual top-down programs often foisted on them by development agencies and international organizations. Iyimogha (2009) observes that traditional folk media have developmental agenda although they now coexist with other modern forms (Umoh, 2010). Asemah (2011, p.316) supports this view noting that the "local population can also bring about endogenous initiatives for development." Local knowledge can be articulated for the reconstruction of indigenous technology. For instance, "the individual human voice, a tool available to even the poorest people may be the key….to Africa's broader political and economic development…"   (Pratt & Jacobson, 2013; p. 103 citing Epstein, 2011). Human voice is demonstrated in music, proverbs, folklores and the events that take place during festivals. Nwamuo, Edegoh, and Asemah (2014) advocated people-centered communication where people use their existing infrastructure to set sustainable development goals. The traditional folk media permits the communication to start from the grass-root and gives recognition to beliefs and cultural practices.

This perspective suggests that centralized planning and execution of development offer little to marginal assistance especially to people who dwell in the rural areas in the developing world. Rather, decentralized planning, where local communities are involved in planning and executing their development ideas is a preferable, pragmatic and result-oriented option. Such a scenario allows people to be involved in development initiatives (Anaeto & Anaeto, 2010) that is in tandem with what Emenanjo and Ojukwu (2012) call inclusive and people-driven development. Awodiya (2013, p.11) sums it thus, "the IK (individual knowledge) initiative ensures that the local population's ideas and practices are not marginalized in the process of their social transformation."

Research Questions

This study was generally conceptualized to examine the community development potentials embedded in the traditional Oka festival of the Awaka people in south eastern part of Nigeria. As such, the specific objectives of the study are twofold: to determine the need which the Oka festival satisfies in the lives of the people of Awaka, and to ascertain the challenges of using the festival for meaningful community development in the locality. These primary objectives, in tandem with the literature reviewed for this study, enabled the framing of the following research questions:

1. What community development needs does the celebration of the Oka festival satisfy in the Awaka community as an entity as well as in the lives of the indigenes of that locality?
2. What principal challenges do the people of Awaka face in their use of the Oka festival for their community development?

Method and Findings

This is a qualitative study that employed participant observation and focus group interviews as one of its tools of inquiry. Wimmer and Dominick (1997) noted that observation help the researcher to gain background information that is necessary to frame the research questions and or hypothesis. Also, Lindlof and Taylor (2002, p. 134) defined participant observation as "the craft of experiencing events in

social settings." The use of this method entailed this researcher participating in the Oka festival for three consecutive years, 2016, 2017 and 2018. Although a participant in the festivals, this researcher also made careful observations about the traditional activity, and took notes about various aspects of the event that are relevant to this study.

For the interview, the snowball sampling technique also known as the chain referral sampling or just referral sampling was used. Lindlof & Tailor (2002) described this method as the study that gets its sample through referrals from people who know of others who possess and share certain attributes and practices that are of research interest. In this regard therefore, the author recruited the initial batch of interviewees who consequently became referrals and guided the researcher to other willing interviewees, all of whom constituted final focus group. In all, 48 pools of respondents were generated and divided into 6 sessions made up of 8 participants each. Although it is arguable that 48 respondents may not be construed as sufficient and representative sample of thousands of Oka festival attendees, it is equally plausible that this group could provide the initial data in an exploratory study such as this, to gain an understanding of festivals and community development in Nigeria, and elsewhere, in subsequent research.

For data analysis, results were triangulated by converging and comparing field notes with interviews conducted. Based on the conversations with interviewees, this researcher was able to thematically aggregate their responses in alignment with the research questions. The key-words-in-context (KWIC) technique was used in creating themes from the observed categories. That is, themes were formed based on categories that represented similar words or synonyms and frequency of mention as observed in the interviews.

Findings

The study sought to explore and examine the needs or motivations the Oka festival satisfies in the lives of members of the Awaka community. The findings are addressed below:

News Dissemination. News and information are disseminated orally in a face-to-face context within the community. The Oka festival serves as a key forum for the highly placed members of the society to pass important information to their brothers, sisters and members of the larger community. The traditional ruler of Awaka town explained that, "I and my chiefs often give important information to my subjects during the festival. I give them important information from the (state) governor and sometimes, I interpret the government's policies to them."

In addition to the traditional ruler and members of his cabinet passing on information and news to his subjects – something that is symbolic of a top-down, vertical model of information and news flow – it was important to assess how information circulated among the people in a more egalitarian and horizontal manner. The discussants and participants in the focus group affirmed that communication during the festival primarily came from the traditional ruler and his chiefs, but noted that it also took the form of exchange of ideas and information among the people celebrating the Oka festival. One discussant articulated and expressed the views of most members of the group thus: "Even when our ruler brings information from the government, we all are free to respond or ask questions. Although we are of

different hierarchies, we all interact during the festival." Another member of the group said that, "It is during the festival that we are briefed about the plans of the government for our town. For instance, in the last Oka festival (2018), our Eze announced the date the Local Government would grade our road and also announced the gifts of three electricity transformers to the three villages that make our town."

Showcasing the people's agricultural heritage and harvest. The community is basically agrarian, where the people farm yam, cassava, and corn. Consequently, the festival presents an opportunity for the communication and exchange of ideas on modern and innovative farming techniques that could help the people have more yields or harvests. The majority of the respondents in the focus group attested to this. Specifically, a respondent made this observation:

> "It is very important to note that from time immemorial, the Oka Awaka (festival) has been a significant opportunity for our people to bond together and build meaningful consensus on how to rise to their common challenges and likewise achieve their collective aspirations as a people. It also provides a useful platform to showcase the rich cultural traditions of dance, masquerades, music and agricultural heritage of the good people of Awaka Ancient Kingdom and poses a great unifying factor in the lives of our people."

> Another participant addressed the issue of better harvests more succinctly, saying, "Awaka corn is the best specie in the world. We are endowed by God, our land is very fertile. The corn is sweet. Please eat it with coconut or pear"

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Community Safety & Security. The Oka festival also presents the opportunity for the community people to diffuse information on how to secure their environment. Vigilante groups are formed and appraisals of their performances are done, in order to have them better serve the community. An indigene informed this researcher that, "It was during Oka day that we announced that a group of kidnappers had invaded our town and we told our kindred to be vigilant (and how to do so)." He continued, "Today, members of that group (of kidnappers) have been arrested." The kidnappers have since been prosecuted and jailed and such community efforts have helped in addressing the spate of kidnapping.

Preaching Moral Virtues. During the Oka festival, moral virtues are preached by leaders and elders in the community. The youths are counseled to desist from engagement in social vices such as kidnapping, joining the "yahoo-yahoo boys" (a group of fraudulent youngsters who use the Internet to defraud their victims), and cultism. Respect for elders and tradition is often preached, with the aim of sanitizing the society and encouraging the perpetuation of cultural values. The Eze (traditional ruler) of the town said in this regard that; "I normally talk about the need to preserve our cultural values in my speech. I appeal to warring factions to desist from fighting and tell our youths to desist from acts that are capable of bringing shame to our town." Corroborating the Eze, Ugoeze (Eze's wife) said, "Our youths are hardworking and well behaved because our town is well known for this festival and they cannot just engage in vices like youths in other towns. My husband tells them at every Oka festival."

Political development of the Community. Issues that pertain to political participation, especially who to vote for, are also discussed during the Oka festival. One of the respondents said: "During elections, political aspirants normally use the opportunity of Oka day festival to present their manifestos and appeal to voters." I like when they come to make sweet promises which they sometimes fulfill." The Eze leverages the festival to publicly endorse candidates as well as critise nonperforming incumbents. Regarding this, the Eze said, "no aspirant who has come to Oka day to campaign has ever failed. I trust my people. We also know how to snub those who loot the treasuries and leave us with potholes"

Showcasing Crafts & Artefacts. The people showcase crafts using their famous corn symbols and patterns to design fanciful and gorgeous attires and accessories. One of the respondents (male) said in this regard that, "The festival is not complete without my necklace designed with corn." Another female respondent (female) said, "My handless (sleeveless) top normally steals the show (at Oka festivals)." All those colorful crafts were observed and noted by this author during the ceremony.

Financial Development/Entrepreneurship. This issue perhaps lies at the bedrock of economic development in the community. During the Oka festival various groups of financial and investment experts are available to offer often free advice to members of the community on various forms of economic and investment opportunities. One of the basic and fundamental advice offered by these experts is that they educate people on various forms of investment opportunities, especially those that require minimal capital and risk. For instance, in the rural community where banking is still not widely embraced especially by poor farmers and people engaged in rudimental economic activities, these experts teach and the people learn about the need to save their money in the bank so that it could yield some interest, instead of keeping it under their pillows and other convenient corners in the bedrooms. A respondent said, "During Oka day, our king would say 'take your money to the bank so that it can yield some interests for you' and that motivated me to start a savings account." Opportunities for loans and grants have also been announced during the festival. According to one discussant, "I got to know about government's business loan to aspiring entrepreneurs through the festival. Through that, I was able to set up my poultry business." Others have also benefited from this micro-economic and investment opportunities in other types of business. However, matters that require heavy financial demands and high levels of investment sophistication understandably do not feature during these festivals.

Display of culinary skills. Women use the festival opportunity to cook different corn dishes and display them at conspicuous areas of the town. Some of these dishes include corn pottage (known as nkporoshi oka), roast corn, boiled corn, and many corn-based dishes feature at the festival. A female member of the focus group described the lure of the corn dishes, saying that, "My siblings normally come from another state to eat nkporoshi oka (corn pottage)." During our interview, the king also noted that "Our women compete with one another during the festival. One even made snacks with corn during the last celebration [2018], and it was quite delicious."

Challenges

What are the challenges posed using the Oka festival for community development

in the Awaka community? Basically, the focus group respondents identified the following obstacles: bad economy, poor timing, dwindling interest in the festival by Awaka indigenes who reside in urban centers, and the spread of Christianity.

a) a) **Economic Challenges:** The respondents unanimously mentioned (Nigeria's) economic challenges in which they found themselves as the chief factor affecting the Oka festival. They observed that their indigenes who normally sponsor the festival now complain of not having funds to continue their sponsorship; at least to the level they did so in the past. Quite a number of them no longer donate money to fund the festival.The Eze said in this regard that, "I have been using my money to sponsor it (the festival). I hope things change for the better in the future."

b) **Poor Timing:** Some other respondents noted that another significant factor that challenges the festival is the timing. They said August is not a period when urban dwellers love to visit their country home. A chief (the Eze's cabinet member) said, "My son living in Lagos (Nigeria's commercial capital) once told me that he has not been attending the festival because he only goes on leave in December." Another respondent corroborated the chief's observation, saying her sons told her about the wrong timing. In her words, "Emeka and Nze said they would only attend Oka festival whenever is fixed for the Christmas (December) period."

c) **Urban dwellers' dwindling interest:** The indigenes of Awaka who are now urban dwellers have over the years showed lack of interest in the festival. Some of them have gone as far as considering it an historical relic, something that has become archaic and primitive. The king's wife explained it this way: "My grandchildren don't want to hear about the festival at all. They say it is meant for older people, not them." Another focus group respondent said in a despondent voice that, "those in the cities are simply not interested. And we cannot force them."

d) **Christianity:** The spread of Christianity was also mentioned as one of the challenges impacting the Oka festival. According to the Eze, "You know, the majority of our people are churchgoers and they are either in the choir, ushering, etc. They do not want to be seen attending a traditional festival where masquerades are showcased." He further lamented that, "As you all know, the festival had existed before the advent of Christianity in this land" and concluded that some of the converts to Christianity appear to have abandoned their roots, including the once cherished traditions and culture into which their forebears were born.

Discussion and Conclusion

One of the pitfalls of studies and literature on community development is the little or non-existent exploration of the place of communication opportunities inherent in cultures across the globe, especially in developing nations. Quite often, development models are applied to communities without regard to their traditions and culture. In this study, the author identified a unique cultural festival among the people of Awaka in the southeastern region of Nigeria, and explored the opportunities offered by their Oka festival in communicating community development to the people. Essentially, this study found significant areas in which the Oka festival fulfilled the development needs of the people through their cultural communication process

embedded in the traditional celebration of their most unique farm product, the corn.

This inherent horizontal communication pattern among members of a community, in this case, the Awaka people, has been identified in the literature as most suitable for community development since it also emphasizes bottom-up participation in community development (Iyimoga, 2009; Anaeto, 2011; Asemah, 2011; Lakev, 2013). As Iyimoga (2009) argued, oral and folk methods of communication have their place in the developmental aspirations and concerns of people who dwell in rural areas, even in the face of modern means of communication.

With regard to this study, the findings show that the Oka festival that is annually celebrated by the people also provides an opportunity for an endogenous attempt at community development.

Through the methodological combination of participant-observation, interviews in a focus group setting, this study was able to establish that for the people of Awaka, the Oka festival contributed immensely toward satisfying their developmental needs in the areas of financial and entrepreneurship training, showcasing and marketing their local crafts and artefacts, the display of culinary skills that promote their prime farm product (the Oka), disseminating measures to enhance community safety and security, encouraging and reiterating moral values that had served as a bond that united the society since their time of their ancestors, and also providing the opportunity for candidates for political office to inform people about items on their development agenda.

Thus, this indigenous knowledge paradigm discussed in the literature review section of this study was helpful in examining how the people of Awaka identified their developmental problems and attempted to find solutions to them under the auspices of their annual Oka festival.

Nonetheless, a number of challenges were also identified in this quest for community development by the people of Awaka in the celebration of their Oka festival and using it to focus attention on enhancing the quality of life in their community. Top among these challenges were the economic uncertainties and difficulties experienced all over the country (Nigeria), which invariably impacted the ability of the indigenes of Awaka to continue their significant sponsorship of the Oka festival. Another issue was identified as the traditional month of August, which no longer provided a good time to host the festival, as it has become difficult for indigenes of the community to obtain necessary permissions from their various offices in larger cities, to participate in the festival. A combination of such reduced level of sponsorship of the event and the inconvenient timing of the festival unfortunately resulted in the lack of appreciable enthusiasm for participation in the festival. Then, there is the threat posed by the upsurge in conversions to Christianity for Awaka indigenes over the years, resulting in some of the converts no longer acknowledging the festival as the cultural event it represents, but rightly or wrongly interpreting participation in the Oka festival as something that contradicts the tenets and injunctions of their Christian beliefs.

Ultimately, these challenges are consistent with Amadi and Agena's (2015) observation and submission that traditional festivals in various indigenous communities that used to serve as the focal point of unity and cultural transmission, have been relegated to the background, and in some instances have suffered significant devaluation of their importance in society, if not abandoned altogether.

Conclusion

While it is important and appropriate to celebrate and fully utilize what modern communication facilities and technologies offer, it is equally important not to lose sight of opportunities for communication-for-development in indigenous communities across the globe. This is the essence of this study which has shown that in the case of the Awaka people in Nigeria, the Oka festival offers opportunities for communication and activities that can be used to engender development.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that this exploratory study has a number of limitations which should be addressed in future studies in this research area. One limitation lies in the number of people recruited for the focus group. Although all forty-eight of them had valuable contributions and insights on this issue, a larger sample may be needed to increase the robust nature of the findings in future studies. Secondly, this study examined only one festival. Future research should look into more than one festival in order to produce more generalizable findings in community development. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of some festivals within and across national boundaries will also be more reliable in determining their relevance in development communication.

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Tweeting to win: Analyzing social media use in India's 2019 national elections

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This study researched the use of Twitter by Indian politicians during their country's national elections in 2019. It specifically studied tweets by India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Congress Party president Rahul Gandhi. It used framing as a theoretical construct and combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches to inquiry in its methodology. Quantitative results show a significant difference in frames used by both politicians on nationalism, economy, culture, and political alliances. A qualitative analysis uncovered themes from the tweets of each politician, with Modi portraying a culturally strong India on the rise while Gandhi portrayed a culturally strong nation facing political and economic problems. Gandhi did not propose a development agenda to counter Modi's plans.

Keywords: India, Twitter, elections, framing, Indian political parties, Narendra Modi, Rahul Gandhi

Politicians across the world use various forms of social media to reach out to their supporters. In particular, Twitter has been used by politicians in many countries as an effective campaign tool during national, state and municipal elections. Such politicians have made policy announcements, reached out to supporters, and made available details about future campaign plans and activities. Twitter has also been used by politicians during election campaign periods to have online debates with their rivals.

U.S. President Donald Trump is among the most frequent users of Twitter for a variety of reasons, including making policy announcements and lambasting his opponents. For instance, when the president dismissed his Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, his decision was first announced on Twitter (Estepa, 2018). His predecessor, President Barack Obama, also used Twitter effectively, but for other reasons. The former president once used Twitter in his reply to a girl who requested to meet him at the White House (Marshall, 2016). In India's context, there are 462 million people in the country who actively use internet ("Penetration of," 2019). There are about 17 million users of Twitter ("Leading countries," 2020) and 346 million users of Facebook in India ("Number of," 2020).

The aim of this study is to examine the frames used by Indian politicians on Twitter at electioneering campaigns, specifically during the 2019 national election in the country. Few studies have addressed this important area of social media use in a country that is the largest democracy in the world. Toward this end, this study investigated how India's incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his

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challenger, Rahul Gandhi, also the leader of India's opposition Congress Party, used Twitter as an instrument of political campaign in the 2019 national election in India.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were applied in this study of tweets used in the 2019 Indian election campaign period. The overarching research question is to explore the use of Twitter by both politicians with a view to determining the main themes in their tweets.

Literature and Theory

Campaign issues in India's national elections

India's Election Commission is a constitutional body set up to conduct national and state elections in the country. On March 10, 2019, the commission officially announced the schedule for the country's national elections, thus setting the stage for political campaigning by leaders of various political parties (Menon, 2019). India has over 600 million registered voters. When the results of the elections were announced on May 23, 2019, India's ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged victorious, winning 303 out of the 543 seats in India's parliament. The BJP had fought the election as part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), while the Congress Party contested the election under the umbrella of the United Progressive Alliance (Pillalamarri, 2019). The Congress Party only managed to win 52 seats.

The elections were fought on a variety of issues that included nationalism, religion and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The BJP is known as a party that espouses Hinduism, a strong foreign policy and nationalism, and business-friendly economic policies. The BJP is also known to have championed the construction of the Ram temple for Hindus in Ayodhya (Vaishnav, 2018). On its part, the opposition Congress Party is identified with its socialist ideology, secularism and welfare of India's minorities from the time India became independent in 1947.

In February 2019, a few months to the elections, a Kashmiri terrorist undertook a suicide bombing of an Indian paramilitary convoy in the Indian state of Kashmir, killing 44 soldiers. India retaliated by bombing Kashmiri terrorist camps at Balakot in Pakistan in its bid to stop Pakistan from promoting terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir ("US condemns Pulwama," 2019). This suicide bombing reinforced the salience of terrorism as an issue in the 2019 election.

The BJP and Modi made nationalism a major election issue. For instance, India opposed China in 2017, thus forcing the Chinese army to retreat from the Doklam region located at India's eastern front (Chengappa & Krishnan, 2017). In terms of administrative reforms, India's national government undertook a series of initiatives aimed at easing the plight of the so-called common man. For instance, the government replaced a set of state tax with a common tax called Goods and Services Tax (GST) to bring about uniformity in taxes across the nation (Anand, 2017). The BJP and Modi also portrayed India's economy as robust and doing well, with the prime minister being quoted as saying that the Indian economy would reach US$ 5 trillion by the year 2024 (Press Trust of India, 2019a).

Given the size of India's economy and its political prominence in South East Asia, it was not unexpected that the international press would pay attention to the country's 2019 election. The New York Times for instance, (The New York Times, 2019) accused Modi of using religion to further his political agenda. It also alleged

that minorities felt unsafe under his regime as they were targeted by rightwing Hindu groups (The New York Times, 2019). However, it is noteworthy that Prime Minister Modi had condemned assaults on religious minorities in India (Wilkes & Menon, 2017). The BJP had since its inception in 1980 given importance to India's cultural past in its bid to strengthen the country's cultural roots. For instance, the Reuters news quoted India's culture minister Mahesh Sharma as saying that his government planned to introduce a "Hindu first" version of India's history in the country's school curriculum that would emphasize India's holistic and indigenous culture (Jain & Lasseter, 2018, p.1). While the BJP and Modi attached significance to India's past, they also used science and technology as a major plank during the campaign. It was against this backdrop that in one of his campaign speeches, Modi announced on television that India had acquired the capability to strike down enemy satellites after India successfully carried out such a major military test (Gettleman & Kumar, 2019).

Prime Minister Modi's government used a developmental agenda as a tool to woo voters in India. For instance, it is a well-known reality that the lack of toilets among households in rural India has been a topical issue over several decades. In order to tackle this issue and convert it to a political advantage, the Indian government hastily built millions of new toilets across the country. It explained that the rationale for the construction of thousands of toilets was to help villagers in the in rural India live a life of dignity (Gettleman et al., 2019). Similarly, the national government embarked on a five-year plan to ensure that every citizen had a bank account to avail themselves of governmental social security benefits (Press Trust of India, 2019b). In addition, the ruling party touted Prime Minister Modi's pro-women plans and activities since coming to power in 2014; the projects were aimed at alleviating the condition of women, especially those of them from poverty-stricken families. One of such projects was the provision of incentives to families to educate girls in order to bring about gender equality in the country (Times News Network, 2019).

The Congress party led by Gandhi proposed an economic package for India's poor to counter the economic policies of Prime Minister Modi. Under the package, almost 20 percent of India's poor were to receive 72,000 Indian Rupee (US$ 1000) once a year if the Congress was voted to power. However, the economic package was criticized by several economists and experts who said that identifying the recipients among India's poor and generating money for funding the package were major impediments to its success (Choudhury, 2019).

Gandhi's strategy focused on highlighting farmer distress in rural India, a lack of jobs for India's educated youth and problems the Modi-led government faced in implementing the Goods and Services Tax, which is a tax that one pays on buying commodities in the market. Gandhi-led Congress Party sought to use the aforementioned issues as national election campaign tools, because they had helped the Congress win state elections in the three states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh a few months before the national elections (Anuja, 2019).

On a more personal level, Gandhi levelled charges of financial corruption against Modi in the procurement of Rafale fighter aircrafts and of Modi favoring some industrialists in the country who are his supporters, such Vijay Mallya. Similarly, to counter Modi's image as a strong nationalist leader the Congress Party questioned the authenticity and rationale for India's airstrikes against Kashmiri terrorist camps

in Balakot, Pakistan.

In a bid to counter BJP's poll plank of cultural nationalism, the Congress Party encouraged its leaders respect the Hindu religion and culture (IANS, 2019). For instance, Gandhi visited the Thirunelli Temple in the Indian state of Kerala during the election campaign (ET Bureau, 2019). While Modi unleashed an election narrative of a strong India that was free from corruption, among other things, the Congress Party largely failed to offer a plan for the future to the Indian electorate (Merelli, 2019), but concentrated more on criticizing the prime minister and his plans.

It is therefore arguable that the 2019 national elections in India were contested on the issues of nationalism, religion, religious minorities, the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, terrorism, defense, foreign affairs, economy, administrative policies, India's culture and its past, science and developmental policies of the BJP-led government, and women's rights.

Twitter and Political Campaigns

Several scholars have studied the use of Twitter in political campaigns. A review of a few of them would suffice in this study. Munoz and Ripolles (2018), for instance, examined the use of Twitter by political parties and politicians during election campaigns in Spain. They conducted a quantitative analysis of the tweets and found that they addressed policies of the national government along with strategies employed by the government to handle them. The researchers also argued that the political parties as institutions tweeted more frequently than their members. The study brought to the fore how political parties and politicians used twitter to frame messages in line with their political party policies and ideologies.

Enli (2017) also studied the twitter strategies of Democratic Party candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican Party's Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and found significant differences in the tweeting styles of both candidates. While Clinton's tweets approached policy issues in a "professional" manner, Trump's tweets were more "amateurish" although both candidates used their tweets to frame campaign issues and set the agenda for public discussion. "Professional" in this context was about the use of tweets to address fundamental and policy issues in the campaign, while "amateurish" refers to the use of tweets for non-policy oriented matters, especially for personal character attacks. Researching the use of Twitter by U.K. and Dutch parliamentary candidates, Graham et al. (2016) found that Dutch politicians used Twitter significantly more frequently than their U.K. counterparts, and that Dutch politicians would personally interact with people more than their U.K. counterparts.

Miller and Ko (2015) researched the use of Twitter during Kuwait's 2012 parliamentary election, and found no relationship between Twitter use and votes obtained by politicians. They also found that Twitter was used less frequently by politicians for political campaigning, but more for communicating with their followers in the country on a variety of information-related matters. The researchers concluded that Kuwaiti politicians used Twitter more as an extension of their daily person-to-person communication with the people than with campaigning for votes.

On his part, Murthy (2015) studied the use of Twitter during 2012 presidential primaries in the Republican Party in the United States, and found that tweets by politicians in the party were more reactive than predictive as well as neutral.

Elaborating, the author argued that the tweets were not predictive of primary results but were only reacting to offline results of the political campaigns by Republican candidates. In another study, Stier et al. (2018) researched the use of social media during the 2013 German federal elections. They investigated whether candidates for political office raised issues on social media that were considered important by the people. The researchers found that the politicians prioritized messages on social media that were different from what the people considered important issues in the country. They found that Twitter was used for direct communication with the audience, while Facebook was used to mobilize people's opinions and for organizational purpose.

While the studies discussed above used one methodology over another, the present study combined qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine the use of Twitter in the 2019 Indian national election.

Framing

Framing is one of the most widely used theories in communication research. Essentially, frames are used in news articles to bring into focus the pieces of information in articles or stories through their positioning, repetition, the use of photographs and their captions, and words, sentence and phrase construction (Entman, 2004). Reese (2001) argued that frames used by journalists in news articles are organizing principles. Reese (2007) also contended that generic news frames used by reporters possessed clarity that helped in better understanding news.

Goffman (1986) also conceptualized framing as a means of presenting an issue or a topic to an audience. He argued that natural and social frameworks were used by people to interpret events and happenings around them, and further explained that physical occurrences were considered as natural framework, while people's manipulation of issues and goals were looked upon as social framework. Gitlin (1980) researched how United States journalists used three frames --- polarization, marginalization and trivialization --- to depict left-leaning politicians and their policies.

An examination of some studies will highlight how their authors employed frames in their analyses. Dimitrova and Ahren (2007) studied the media depiction of the 2003 U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussain's Iraq. The authors used four media organizations in their research, namely: The New York Times and The Guardian (representing the West) and two Arab media outlets, Al Ahram and Al Jazeera. In their study, the researchers determined that the Arab press used the violence of war and military conflict frames in their news stories while The Guardian and The New York Times used the rebuilding of Iraq frame significantly in their news stories. Overall, Dimitrova and Ahren (2007) argued that the Western press was neutral in their coverage war, while the Arab press was quite critical about the war and took sides in reporting it.

Holt (2012) researched the way in which the U.S. press portrayed the 2008 U.S. democratic presidential primary candidates, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton and found that the media highlighted Obama's race more prominently than Clinton's. On the other hand, the study concluded that Clinton's gender was mentioned significantly and frequently than Obama's.

Hanson (1995) researched the portrayal of news stories on the front page of the

Times of India and argued that overall international news gained prominence on the cover page of the newspaper, especially when the Indian government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent troops to Sri Lanka to fight Tamil guerrilla fighters. The study also showed the Times of India would focus on international news more significantly on its front page only when India was militarily involved in foreign nations.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
In the present research, the focus is on the frames used by two prominent Indian politicians, Prime Minister Modi and his challenger, Congress Party's flagbearer, Rahul Gandhi, in Twitter messages during 2019 national elections in their country. Given that both politicians represent political parties that had different ideological positions on development and economic issues as well as governance in general, as explored in the literature review, the following research questions were designed for this study:

RQ 1: Given that Prime Minister Modi and challenger, Rahul Gandhi, have different political party alliances, to what extent will this impact their tweets in the 2019 Indian general election?

RQ2: (a) What are the prominent issues in the tweets by Prime Minister Modi and Rahul Gandhi? (b) What are the overall tones in the tweets in terms of support for each candidate's political party alliance and criticism of the opposition?

RQ3: What prominent themes emerged from the tweets by Prime Minister Modi and challenger Rahul Gandhi?

The hypotheses are as follows:

H 1: There would be significant differences in tweets by the two politicians on the issue of national development.

H2: There would be significant differences in tweets from the two politicians on the issue of Indian nationalism.

H3: There would be significant differences in tweets by both politicians on economic issues.

Hypothesis 4: There would be significant differences in tweets by both politicians on cultural issues.

Method

The quantitative content analysis of the tweets by Prime Minister Modi and challenger, Rahul Gandhi, was undertaken in this study. This was complemented by a qualitative examination of the tweets to uncover their latent and underlying messages and themes.

Quantitative Method
The Twitter accounts of Modi (@narendramodi) and Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) were accessed and analyzed in this study, the rationale being that they were the two major contestants in the 2019 general election, with Modi as the incumbent prime minister and Gandhi as the Congress Party's flagbearer and main challenger for the prime ministerial position. Modi's twitter portal reportedly has over 50 million followers (Vinayak, 2019), while Gandhi's was estimated to be about 11 million followers (Press Trust of India, 2019c).

The time frame for the collection of tweets examined in this study was between March 10, 2019, when the India's Election Commission announced the election schedule, and May 23, 2019, when election results were announced. The rationale for studying the tweets in this 74-day period is that in India the official campaigning begins after the Election Commission announces the schedule and implements the election code of conduct across India until the results are announced (Menon, 2019)

This study used the NVivo software to download all the tweets from the Twitter accounts of both politicians in the aforementioned 74-day timeframe. According to its manufacturers, the NVivo software is most helpful to researchers who use qualitative and mixed methods to examine data as it was developed to, "Uncover richer insights and produce clearly articulated, defensible findings backed by rigorous evidence".[1]

The unit of analysis in this study is the tweet by both candidates. In this regard, Modi's tweets downloaded in the period of study was 1,022 while that of Gandhi was 129. A coding sheet was developed and coding was done to determine the presence or absence of frames related to the election campaign, as well as the tone of each tweet. Each tweet was manually coded for the categories: Nationalism, Hinduism, minorities, Kashmir, terrorism, defense, foreign affairs, economy, administrative policies, own party/alliance, opposition parties/alliance, culture, history, sciences, development, gender, and other. For instance, a tweet by Congress leader Gandhi stated that, "Gabbar Singh Tax and Demonetisation destroyed crores (millions) of jobs causing tremendous pain and badly damaging our economy. The Congress Party is committed to GST 2.0 - a single GST, with simple reporting," ("Congress committed," 2019, p. 1). This was recorded as the economy frame and was coded as being critical in tone. On the other hand, one of Modi's tweet said, "Gurudev Tagore manifests the best of India's ethos of learning and expressing. A multifaceted personality, his prose, poetry and artwork are brilliant and thought provoking. He enhanced India's pride and richly contributed to the freedom movement. Tributes to him on his Jayanti," ("Bengal observes," 2019, p. 1). This was attributed to the culture frame and was coded as being neutral in its tone.

To calculate inter-coder reliability, a separate set of 100 tweets from both politicians not included in the study sample were coded independently by the two coders. They were collected in the period immediately before the election campaigning phase. The Krippendorf's alpha (Hayes & Krippendorf, 2007) was used to calculate inter-coder reliability, and a coefficient 0.90 was recorded. Thereafter, data from the politicians' tweets were entered into an SPSS file for statistical analysis.

Qualitative Method
To determine the common themes in the tweets by both politicians, the researchers physically studied all tweets disseminated by the contestants in the period of study. They used the four stages identified by Boyatzis (1998) for this purpose: (1) "sensing themes," that is, highlighting the codable portions of each tweet included in the sample; (2) coding the tweets in a consistent manner to ensure they were coded

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1 See https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home

in a similar way; (3) setting up codes from the tweets in the research sample; (4) interpreting the themes obtained from the tweets, using a theoretical framework.

The researchers read all the tweets by each of the politicians several times before themes were sensed from them. The codes that were identified and treated as themes for the rest of the qualitative study were: Nationalism, Hinduism, minorities, Kashmir, terrorism, defense, foreign affairs, economy, administrative policies, own party/alliance, opposition parties/alliance, culture, history, sciences, development, gender, and other. Thereafter, the researchers read the tweets, focusing on words and issues used and emphasized in them. As a result, tweets that had similar themes were grouped together under common themes.

At the end of this extensive reading and classification exercise, what emerged as the common themes for Modi's were: Unique India, religious India, prosperous India, strong Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), people's support, opposition parties' misdeeds, rudderless opposition parties, Congress party's betrayal. On the other hand, the common themes set up for Gandhi's tweets were: Resurgent Congress Party, people's connect, India's economic crisis, Modi government betraying Indians, and heritage India.

To illustrate the above process, a tweet by Gandhi ("Congress committed," 2019, p. 1) read: "Gabbar Singh Tax and Demonetisation destroyed crores (millions) of jobs causing tremendous pain and badly damaging our economy. The Congress Party is committed to GST 2.0 - a single GST, with simple reporting." This was initially categorized as the economy theme, but finally it was recorded under the common theme: India's economic crisis. One of Modi's tweets ("Bengal observes," 2019, p. 1) read: "Gurudev Tagore manifests the best of India's ethos of learning and expressing. A multifaceted personality, his prose, poetry and artwork are brilliant and thought provoking. He enhanced India's pride and richly contributed to the freedom movement. Tributes to him on his Jayanti." This was initially categorized as the culture theme, but finally recorded under the common theme: Unique India.

Results

In this study, the authors assessed the tweets from the twitter accounts of Prime Minister Modi and his challenger, Gandhi, during the 2019 Indian national election campaigns. Pearson's chi square tests were done to test whether there were significant differences in the tweets by both prominent politicians on the issues of development, nationalism, economy and culture against the backdrop of their political party affiliation and alliance. These were the top domestic issues in the campaigns.

While development was a major issue during election campaigning, this study found that only 3.13% of Modi's tweets were about India's development, while Gandhi devoted 5.42% of his tweets to the same issue. However, a Pearson's chi square test found no significant difference on tweets related to development by Modi and Gandhi X^2 (1, N =1151) = 1.8, p > 0.05. Therefore, the first hypothesis did not find support from the findings of this study (see Table 1 below).

Nationalism was another topical issue in India's 2019 election campaign, hence the second hypothesis sought to determine if there were significant differences between the tweets by both politicians. On this issue, the results show that 13.5% of Modi's tweets were about nationalism, while for Gandhi, it was only 3.1%. A

Pearson's chi square test found a significant difference between tweets related to the issue of nationalism by Modi and Gandhi X^2 (1, N =1151) = 11.46, p < 0.001. Therefore, the second hypothesis was supported (see Tables 1 and 2).

The state of a nation's economy is always a primary campaign issue during elections. In this regard, the third hypothesis was about ascertaining if significant differences existed between the tweets of both politicians on the issue of India's economic landscape. Interestingly, as few as 1.3% of Modi's tweets and 5.4% of Gandhi's tweets were about India's economy. Nonetheless, a Pearson's chi square test found that there was a significant difference between the tweets published by both politicians on India's economy X^2 (1, N =1151) = 10.52, p < 0.001. Therefore, the third hypothesis found support from the findings of this study (see Tables 1 and 2).

Culture was another major campaign issue. Therefore the fourth hypothesis was about establishing if there was a significant difference between the tweets on culture by both politicians. As many as 4.1% of Modi's tweets and 13.95% of Gandhi's tweets were about culture. A Pearson's chi square test found there was a significant difference between tweets related to culture by the two politicians X^2 (1, N =1151) = 22.46, p < 0.001. (see Tables 1 and 2).

The first research question was whether there would be significant difference in tweets from the two politicians with regard to their own political alliance comprising their own political party and political parties allied with them. As many as 41.09% of Modi's tweets and 28.68% of Gandhi's tweets were about their own political party and allies. A Pearson's chi square test found there was significant difference between tweets related to each politician's own political alliance X^2 (1, N =1151) = 7.37, p < 0.05. Therefore, in answer to the first research question, findings from this study lay out that there was significant difference in tweets from the two politicians on the issue of their political alliance.

In order to provide an evidenced response to the first research question, the authors of the present study examined the entire tweets by the prime minister and his challenger and found that as much as 41.09% of Modi's tweets and 28.68% of Gandhi's tweets were about their own political party and allies. Furthermore, a Pearson's chi square test found that there was a statistically significant difference between how the tweets related to each politician's own political alliance X^2 (1, N =1151) = 7.37, p < 0.05. Therefore, it is clear that the response to the first research question is that indeed their political party affiliation and alliances impacted the nature of tweets released by Prime Minister Modi and his political rival, Gandhi (see Table 1).

The second research question is about the prominent issues in the tweets by the two contestants for prime ministerial office, as well as the tones in which the issues were expressed in relation to supporting their political party alliances and criticizing the opposition. Results on Tables 2 and 3 show the issues that featured in the elections, as well as the overall tones for political party support and criticism of the opposition. On tones, the results show that in his tweets, Modi was more in support of his political party alliance (34.93%) than Gandhi (27.13%), while the opposite was the case in being critical of the opposition, as Gandhi devoted 22.48% of his tweets attacking the opposition than Modi (16.92%). With regard to the top five issues in each candidate's tweets, Modi had the following: Nationalism (13.5%), Culture (4.1%), Hinduism (3.91%), Foreign Affairs (3.71%) and Development

(3.13%), and for Gandhi, they were: Culture (13.95%), Development (5.43%), Administration (4.65%), History (5.42%) and Economy (5.40%).

The third research question is about the prominent themes that emerged from the tweets by Modi and Gandhi. In this regard, the qualitative aspect of this study shows the following prominent themes on Tables 4.

Table 1. Issues and significance levels in tweets by Modi and Gandhi

Parameters	N	Df	x2	P
Development	1151	1	1.8	Not Significant
Nationalism	1151	1	11.46	0.001
Economy	1151	1	10.52	0.001
Culture	1151	1	22.46	0.001
Political alliance	1151	1	7.37	0.05

Table 2: Elections Issues and Tweets

Issues	Modi (%)	Gandhi (%)
Development	3.13% (32)	5.43% (7)
Nationalism	13.5% (138)	3.10% (4)
Hinduism	3.91% (40)	0.77% (1)
Minorities	0.68% (7)	00% (0)
Kashmir	0.48% (5)	00% (0)
Terrorism	1.46% (15)	2.32% (3)
Defense	1.66% (17)	2.32% (3)
Foreign Affairs	3.71% (38)	1.55% (2)
Economy	1.3% (13)	5.4% (7)
Admin Policy	2.25% (23)	4.65% (6)
Own Party/Alliance	41.09% (419)	28.68% (37)
Opposition Party/Alliance	17.12% (175)	23.25% (30)
Culture	4.1% (42)	13.95% (18)
History	2.64% (27)	5.42% (7)
Sciences	1.36% (14)	0.77% (1)
Gender	0.88% (9)	1.55% (2)
Other	0.78% (8)	0.77% (1)

Table 3: Tone of Issues in Tweets

Candidate	Supportive of Own Alliance	Critical of Opposition	Neutral
Modi	34.93%	16.92%	48.14%
Gandhi	27.13%	22.48%	50.38%

Table 4: Prominent Themes in Candidates' Tweets

Candidates	Theme	Reference
Modi	Unique India	Tweets portraying India's ancient culture and heritage.
	Religious India	Tweets portraying India's religious diversity.
	Prosperous India	Tweets portraying India's strong economy under Narendra Modi's government.
	Strong Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	Tweets portraying the ruling BJP as a strong party capable of ruling India.
	People's support	Tweets portraying the support the ruling party (BJP) enjoys among India's masses.
	Opposition parties' misdeeds	Tweets portraying anti-people policies of opposition political parties.
	Rudderless opposition parties	Tweets portraying opposition political parties without a game plan and headed for defeat in India's national elections.
	Congress party betrayal	Tweets portraying the opposition Congress party as having betrayed the aspirations of the people of India through its policies.
Gandhi		
	Resurgent CongressParty	Tweets were about Congress Party and its members upbeat and campaigning across India
	People's Connect	Tweets were about Rahul Gandhi and Congress Party reaching out to Indians across the country.
	India's Economic Crisis	Tweets were about the poor state of India's economy since Narendra Modi took over as prime minister in 2014.
	Modi Government Betraying Indians	Tweets about unkept promises by India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
	Heritage India	Tweets about India's ancient culture and plurality of religions.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study evaluated the use of Twitter by incumbent prime minister, Narendra Modi and his challenger, Rahul Gandhi, during national elections held in India in 2019. An important finding in this analysis is that there was no significant difference in the tweets on the issue of national development by both contestants. Indeed the tweets were quite limited (see Table 1) contrary to the expectation that in an election year, the issue of national development ought to feature prominently on the campaign agenda. While we did not investigate the reason for this finding, it may be reasonable to suggest that since development schemes were geared toward the poor and farmers in rural India, most of whom still do not have access to computers and the Internet, both Prime Minister Modi and Gandhi may have chosen to limit their tweets on this issue since the huge population affected people in the rural areas could not access them.

A rather curious revelation from this study is the way both candidates chose to prioritize and lay emphasis on different issues, in spite of the fact that they were appealing to the same electorate. For instance, the issue of India's nationalism has always been a key issue to Modi and his party, the B.J.P. Therefore, a strong thrust on nationalism was evident in Modi's tweets (13.5%). In fact, the prime minister made this a cornerstone of his campaign. This was in contrast to Gandhi for whom the question of nationalism was not even top of the five issues he campaigned on during the election.

On the other hand, Gandhi devoted a significantly higher percentage (5.4%) of his tweets to the country's economy, although the question of culture ranked top of his five major campaign issues. This emphasis on the economy was expected because as an opposition leader he had to impress upon people the idea that the country's economy was not doing well under Modi's regime. In fact, Gandhi even accused Modi of having committed economic improprieties, such as the purchase of Rafale attack aircraft from France. For Modi, the sitting prime minister, India's economy was not a matter of priority in his tweets. Not only did it not feature prominently in his tweets, it ranked among the least mentioned (1.3%) in this method of social media communication. This raises the question: Why would a sitting prime minister de-emphasize the economy in the tweets for his reelection campaign? On the surface, at least, excluding economic issues in the tweets sounds counterintuitive.

Another pertinent observation at this point is that Gandhi devoted a significantly higher percentage of his tweets to India's culture (13.95%). Indeed, this was his most prominent tweet, and we suggest that it may have been done to counter the narrative on culture that Modi had built over the years. In the campaign, Modi stressed India's unique cultural practices that go back thousands of years. Culture was Modi's fourth most tweeted issue (4.1%).

Modi devoted a significant number of tweets to his own party and alliance (41.09%) as compared with Congress leader Gandhi (28.68%). The authors of this study argue that there were many reasons for such tweets. First, Modi was using tweets about his own political party and alliance to reach out and acknowledge the hard work being done by his party, the B.J.P. We surmise that his aim may have been to enthuse his party cadre to campaign more vigorously ahead of the national elections. Another reason for this may have been to showcase to the

Indian electorate the connection that his party has with the masses, and especially to demonstrate the vast network of his party cadre across the nation. It is arguable that the B.J.P. is today one of the largest political parties in India. Modi's attacks on the opposition which amounted to 17.12% of his tweets can also been seen in this context. We also make a similar argument for Gandhi who devoted 28.68% of his tweets to his own party and alliance, and 23.25% of the tweets towards criticizing the opposition.

We make the claim that our quantitative results were bolstered by findings in the qualitative component of the study. The common themes as well as differences underlying the tweets by both politicians support this contention (see Table 4). Both Gandhi and Modi emphasized India's rich cultural roots. This was expected because all political parties in India praise the country's unique and ancient culture. Both politicians also showed strong connections with their respective political parties and supporters. This was done to send a message that their political party was popular enough to win the 2019 national elections in India.

The difference in common themes from the tweets of both leaders portray a very different picture of India's economy. While Modi projected a prosperous India that was thriving on a booming economy, Gandhi portrayed a picture of India that has been in an economic crisis since Modi came to office in 2014. One of Modi's prominent themes was about Congress Party having betrayed India when it was in power. Gandhi countered by portraying the Modi-led government as having betrayed Indians by not fulfilling its promises. In other words, both contestants mutually tweeted about each other as being incapable of ruling and uplifting India.

Two key takeaways from this research are that: (a) both Prime Minister Modi and the Congress leader Gandhi's tweets did not bring to the fore their development agenda for the country. There was no significant difference in the way both contestants downplayed the issue of development in their tweets. Furthermore, while Modi generally tweeted about a prosperous India, Gandhi did not quite articulate and present an alternative to Modi's programs; (b) both contestants almost relegated the issue of India's minority groups to the fringes of their tweeting profile, with Gandhi whose party had consistently championed the cause of minorities, especially religious minorities, in the past being silent on the matter.

Overall, both contestants used their tweets more to praise their political party and alliances and throw barbs at each other, more than they dealt with the important issues of India's economy and national development.

Conclusion

This research contributes to the growing attention to the use of Twitter for political communication in India, especially in examining how contestants for the highest office in the country use their Twitter as a social media platform to send messages to their teeming followers.

With reference to the questions addressed in this research, it is clear that both candidates spent more "Tweeter" energy criticizing each other's real and perceived misdeeds, and touting the strengths of their political alliances, and how wide spread their support base is, than on issues related to India's economy and national development. It is axiomatic that opposition candidates especially in presidential and prime ministerial elections not only disparage the ruling party and its candidate, but attempt to articulate an alternative blueprint to move the

country forward. Quite remarkably, Rahul Gandhi did not utilize his tweets to sell his alternative to the prime minister's vision and work as an incumbent.

Although the promotion and sustenance of India's cultural heritage are no doubt important subjects, the emergence of this heritage as a top campaign agenda for both candidates appear to have disproportionately relegated other important subjects such as the economy to the background.

While we argue that this focus on the use of tweets in the 2019 India's national election is appropriate and contributes to expanding research on political communication in the country, we concede that it is also important for research to focus on the types of images and video clips used in that election. Perhaps, future research in this genre should address this shortcoming.

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Discourses of the Developing World: Researching Properties, Problems and Potentials of the Developing World

Shi-xu, Kwesi Kwaa Prah, & María Laura Pardo

Routledge, 2018. ISBN: 9780367133849

From the get-go, *Discourses of the Developing World,* authored by Shi-xu, Kwesi Kwaa Prah, and María Laura Pardo, hailing from China, Africa, and Latin America, respectively, offers a compelling argument to rethink development not just in practice, but in discourse. The trio provide an in-depth analysis encompassing multiple aspects of culture and history in three different continents, and bring forth the neglected narratives marginalized by the equivocal Eurocentric views.

Part 1, Asian Discourse Studies (ADS), authored by Professor Shi-Xu, a Changjiang Distinguished Professor and the founding Director of the Center for Discourse and Cultural Studies at Hangzhou Normal University, China, addresses the assumptions undertaken philosophically, theoretically and methodologically by the scholarship of development discourse. For the purpose of "re-envisioning, reclaiming and reformulating Asia's path to development," Professor Xu encourages Eastern scholars to research the Asian culture in promoting its nuanced peculiarities borrowed from Daoism, Shintoism, Hinduism and Confucianism.

She exemplifies the suggestion by detailing the psychological organization of the Chinese culture and examining the discourse on globalization through the lens of city branding, such as Hangzhou, the provincial capital of Zhejiang. Xu analyzes the case of Hangzhou in Chapter 2 as an urban global city through semiotic modes. Through exhibitions, trade events, architecture and cuisine, the holistic culture of the city pulls at the heart of traders and tourists alike, playing to the business and political advantage of the nation.

In Part 2, African Discourse Studies, Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Professor Emeritus in Sociology at the University of Western Cape (South Africa) and the founder of Center for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS), ventures to ask the "language question." Is English superior to other native languages? He warns that if the African development, in the shadows of the erstwhile colonist, does not cede its indecisive and spasmodic trend, indicated by the reliance on GDP and GNP, among other things, then "Africans as a historical and cultural product is silenced in favor of his colonial master's voice and languages" (p. 75).

In Chapter 5, Prah focuses on the possibility of implementation of local languages in schools. He uses qualitative measures to assess the gap between patois spoken in streets and the use of English in academia and by the elites. His analysis reveals the unceasing flow of culture and technologies from the developed to the developing nations. This standardization and simple acceptance of foreign culture has led the guileless natives to abandon their own identity as something inferior.

Prah further examines the systemic failings in supporting the use of indegenous languages, such as KiSwahili, Xhosa, Zulu and Ndebele, in Chapter 6. The inconsistencies in government policy have furthered the challenge of preserving the indigenous culture. To achieve real progress, Prah argues, African countries must retain their value systems, including evaluating and intellectualizing the patois.

Latin Discourse Studies is the focus of Part 3, authored by Maria Lauro Pardo, researcher at the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research and the Director of the Department of Linguistics at the Philosophical and Cultural Anthropology Research Center (University of Buenos Aires, Argentina). In these chapters, Pardo presents a brief history of Latin America, analyzes how the coexistence of modernity and post modernity has shaped the culture of the area, and provides a case study of four television programs commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Falklands/Malvinas War. In this analysis, she uses Information Hierarchy Theory to examine the narratives, revealing a value system dominated by anti-imperialistic views, triumphalism and regionalization.

In Chapter 9, Pardo turns her attention to the quiet acceptance of poverty and homelessness in cities like Buenos Aires as a mere consequence of capitalism. If a culture is defined as a value system practiced by an individual with free will, can the extremely poor afford to have a culture of their own? She argues that the homeless are coerced by the circumstance into a survival mode devoid of the luxury of free will.

This book is valuable for those who seek to understand the journey of development through culture and politics and the problems with the current research approaches. It is relevant for international communication scholars and students who aspire to familiarize themselves with cultural discourses. Most importantly, this book reminds its readers how valid insights can be gained from studying the local identity.

Reviewer
Dr. Srishti Puri is the Chair of Social Media, International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC).

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